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RIGHTS-BASED APPROACHES TO 
EXAMINING WAIVER CLAUSES IN PEACE 
TREATIES: LESSONS FROM THE JAPANESE 
FORCED LABOR LITIGATION IN 
CALIFORNIAN COURTS 
Dinusha Panditaratne*
Abstract: Waiver clauses, which purport to bar claims for reparations, 
appear in numerous historical and contemporary peace agreements, 
including in the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan. This Article questions 
the validity of many such waivers under the Constitution and applicable 
international law. However, as demonstrated in a series of federal court 
decisions from 2000 to 2003 which rejected the reparations claims of 
former forced laborers in wartime Japan, judges are induced by political 
considerations to uphold the validity of waiver clauses. How can courts 
reconcile their duty to protect the fundamental rights of claimants with 
the realpolitik considerations at play? One answer lies in adopting 
established interpretive approaches to limit the scope of a waiver clause. 
The waiver clause in the 1951 Treaty, like many of its counterparts in 
other treaties, contains several ambiguities. This Article outlines three 
rights-based interpretive approaches and demonstrates how these could 
have been invoked to construe one particularly ambiguous aspect of the 
waiver in the 1951 Treaty, in a manner which would have reconciled 
competing policy imperatives. 
Introduction 
 From 1999 through 2003, numerous former prisoners of war 
(POWs) and civilians who were forced laborers in wartime Japan ªled 
suits against the corporations for whom they had worked.1 Their 
                                                                                                                      
* Attorney admitted to practice in the State of New York. B.A. in Jurisprudence (Ox-
ford); LL.M. (Yale). Visiting Assistant Professor at the School of Law, City University of 
Hong Kong. I wish to thank Brannon Denning and Dumith Fernando for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
1 Over thirty individual and class action suits against Japanese corporations—and in 
certain cases, their U.S. subsidiaries and afªliates—were ªled between 1999 and 2001 
alone. See Kinue Tokudome, POW Forced Labor Lawsuits Against Japanese Companies ( Japan 
Policy Research Inst. Working Paper No. 82, Nov. 2001), at http://www.jpri.org/publica 
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claims were triggered by Section 354.6 of the California Code of Civil 
Procedure2 which purported to grant any World War II slave laborer 
or forced laborer the right to sue for compensation.3
 In 2000 and 2001, however, federal district courts dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ claims on the ground that they were incompatible with the 
1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan4 (1951 Treaty) and, speciªcally, with 
the waiver clause contained in Article 14(b) of that treaty, which states: 
                                                                                                                      
tions/workingpapers/wp82.html; see also Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 705-06 
(9th Cir. 2003) (“Deutsch II”) (tracing the history of twenty-seven of these suits). 
2 For the legislative history of Section 354.6, see http://ssl.csg.org/dockets/22cycle/ 
2002A/2002Abills/1722a06ca.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2005). 
3 See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 354.6(b) (1999) (declared unconstitutional in Deutsch II, 
324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003)). The Code provides that, regardless of any applicable statute 
of limitation that may otherwise bar such litigation, 
[a]ny Second World War slave labor victim, or heir of a Second World War 
slave labor victim, Second World War forced labor victim, or heir of a Second 
World War forced labor victim, may bring an action to recover compensation 
for labor performed as a Second World War slave labor victim or Second 
World War forced labor victim from any entity or successor in interest 
thereof, for whom that labor was performed, either directly or through a sub-
sidiary or afªliate. 
Id. Section 354.6 deªnes “forced labor” and “slave labor” differently. Section 354.6(a)(1) 
provides that: 
“Second World War slave labor victim” means any person taken from a con-
centration camp or ghetto or diverted from transportation to a concentration 
camp or from a ghetto to perform labor without pay for any period of time 
between 1929 and 1945, by the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers, or en-
terprises transacting business in any of the areas occupied by or under con-
trol of the Nazi regime or its allies and sympathizers. 
Id. By contrast, Section 354.6(a)(2) provides that: 
“Second World War forced labor victim” means any person who was a mem-
ber of the civilian population conquered by the Nazi regime, its allies or sym-
pathizers, or prisoner-of-war of the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers, 
forced to perform labor without pay for any period of time between 1929 and 
1945, by the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers, or enterprises transact-
ing business in any of the areas occupied by or under control of the Nazi re-
gime or its allies and sympathizers. 
Id. The term “forced laborers” will be used in this Article when referring to the former 
forced laborers in Japan who ªled claims pursuant to Section 354.6, given that the 
deªnition of a “slave labor victim” in Section 354.6(a)(1) makes reference to “concentra-
tion camps” and “ghettos,” concepts which are associated with wartime Europe rather than 
wartime Japan. Furthermore, the deªnition of a “forced labor victim” in Section 
354.6(a)(2) expressly refers to “civilians” and “prisoners of war,” terms which describe the 
wartime status of plaintiffs in the cases examined in this Article. See id. 
4 Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 136 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter 
1951 Treaty]. 
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Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Al-
lied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, 
other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising 
out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the 
course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied 
Powers for direct military costs of occupation.5
Additionally, the district courts held that Section 354.6 was an unconsti-
tutional infringement by California of the foreign affairs power of the 
federal government. The district courts’ decisions were subsequently 
afªrmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
the case of Deutsch v. Turner Corp.6 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Deutsch effectively ended the hopes of victims of forced labor in wartime 
Japan of obtaining compensation on the basis of Section 354.6. In Oc-
tober 2003, the United States Supreme Court refused a petition for the 
writ of certiorari with respect to the Ninth Circuit’s decision.7
 This Article does not delve into the longstanding debate regard-
ing the capacity of states to legislate on matters of foreign policy un-
der federal constitutional law. Consequently, it does not assess the 
courts’ refusal to grant the forced laborers’ claims for compensation 
on the ground that Section 354.6 was unconstitutional for violating 
the federal foreign affairs and war powers. There are reasons to sup-
port the position of the Ninth Circuit in Deutsch as well as the Su-
preme Court’s position in recent decisions8 that the federal arm of 
government is supreme over states in the realm of foreign affairs, 
which have already been elucidated by other commentators.9 How-
                                                                                                                      
5 Id. art. 14(b), 3 U.S.T. at 3183, 136 U.N.T.S. at 64. 
6 Deutsch II, 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003), amending and superseding Deutsch v. Turner 
Corp., 317 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Deutsch I”). 
7 See Saldajeno v. Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha, Ltd., 540 U.S. 821 (2003); Suk Yoon Kim v. 
Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries, 540 U.S. 820 (2003); Tenney v. Mitsui & Co., 540 
U.S. 820 (2003); Zhenhuan Ma v. Kajima Corp., 540 U.S. 820 (2003). The Supreme 
Court’s refusal to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Deutsch II was unsurprising in light 
of its earlier decision, issued in June 2003, in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 
U.S. 396 (2003), where the Court held that California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief 
Act of 1999, Cal. Ins. Code §§ 13800–13807 (1999) [hereinafter HVIRA], unconstitution-
ally interferes with the President’s conduct of foreign policy. 
8 See, e.g., Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 397. 
9 See generally Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Constitutionality of State and 
Local “Sanctions” Against Foreign Countries: Affairs of State, States’ Affairs, or a Sorry State of 
Affairs?, 26 Hastings Const. L.Q. 307 (1999). The article pre-dates the Japanese forced 
labor litigation but cautions against upholding state and local laws that aim to promote 
global human rights standards by imposing “sanctions” against foreign countries with poor 
human rights records. For an alternate view, see generally Curtis A. Bradley, World War II 
Compensation and Foreign Relations Federalism, 20 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 282 (2002). 
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ever, now that states clearly have been restricted in legislating on mat-
ters affecting foreign policy, it is imperative to examine what role the 
courts should have in overseeing provisions in treaties and federal ex-
ecutive agreements. 
 It is an underlying tenet of this Article that in a federal democ-
racy, both states and courts have a vital role to play in ensuring plural-
istic government with counter-majoritarian checks.10 And if states are 
to be circumscribed from playing any signiªcant role in foreign af-
fairs, even where their intention is only to protect individual rights, 
then there is an even greater need for courts to act as judicial overse-
ers of treaties and other international agreements entered into by the 
federal government.11 It is a matter for particular concern when 
courts retreat from examining agreements which infringe upon the 
rights of individuals to make claims for serious human rights viola-
tions, especially when those violations have not been committed by 
other nations per se, but by corporations or other private parties.12 Yet 
such a judicial retreat was precisely what occurred when the federal 
district courts and the Ninth Circuit were called on to examine the 
validity and import of Article 14(b) of the 1951 Treaty on former 
forced laborers’ claims for compensation.13
                                                                                                                      
10 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 140–49 (1977) (discussing the 
role of the courts in protecting rights). States and courts are intrinsically more likely to 
protect individual rights than the federal arms of government, which have a greater ten-
dency to be concerned with broader matters such as national security and the mainte-
nance of trade and other relations with foreign countries. By contrast, states and local 
communities are responsive to a narrower ªeld of stakeholders, and courts focus (at least 
in civil matters) on resolving disputes among individuals and other private parties. 
11 See Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties are Law of 
the United States, 20 Mich. J. Int’l L. 301, 320–21 (1999) (noting the historical foundation 
of the view that U.S. judges should be vigilant protectors of individual rights against gov-
ernment encroachment). Paust comments that “the Founders had worried about the dan-
gers of oppression and denial of rights by a government that is a mere instrument of the 
majority” and that “[j]udicial power is an integral part of the constitutional design for the 
separation of powers.” Id. 
12 At least one commentator has criticized the courts’ deferential approach to execu-
tive agreements (i.e., agreements which are neither treaties ratiªed by the Senate, nor 
made with other congressional approval) that waive private claims against non-sovereign 
entities. See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The Dangers of Deference: International Claim Settlement by 
the President, 44 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1 (2003) (arguing that a series of such agreements, which 
were made during the ªnal months of the Clinton administration, conºict with the Treaty 
and Supremacy Clauses of the Constitution and “mark an important departure from prior 
practice by resolving pending U.S. litigation against private companies rather than claims 
against foreign sovereigns”). Even with respect to treaties and congressionally approved 
executive agreements, courts should adopt a rights-based examination and interpretation 
of such documents. See infra Parts II, IV. 
13 See infra Parts II, IV. 
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 Section 354.6 is only one example of numerous pieces of state and 
local legislation which show that human rights values now have taken 
root in political and law-making culture.14 If states no longer are able to 
act on matters which affect foreign affairs, the courts must approach 
the inspection and interpretation of treaties and other international 
agreements entered into by federal powers in a manner which supports 
these human rights values.15 Indeed, this rights-based approach by 
courts in assessing treaty provisions is strongly supported by historical 
judicial precedent, as evinced in earlier Supreme Court cases, such as 
Asakura v. City of Seattle.16 This Article suggests how such a rights-based 
approach could have been implemented by the courts that assessed 
Article 14(b) in the Japanese forced labor cases, and thereby also indi-
cates how it could be pursued in the context of other provisions in 
peace treaties which adversely impact human rights. Clauses similar to 
Article 14(b) appear in numerous international peace agreements, in-
cluding several that have been concluded in recent years.17
                                                                                                                      
14 Examples of state human rights legislation include Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 354.6 
(1999), the HVIRA, Cal. Ins. Code §§ 13800–13807 (1999), and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 7, 
§§ 22G–M (2004) (declared unconstitutional in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 
U.S. 363 (2000)), a Massachusetts statute that prevented the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts from purchasing goods or services from individuals or companies engaging in busi-
ness with Myanmar (previously known as Burma) [hereinafter Massachusetts Burma Law]. 
For a discussion of some of these initiatives and of other state and local legislation, see 
Denning & McCall, supra note 9, Danielle Everett, Comment, New Concern for Transnational 
Corporations: Potential Liability for Tortious Acts Committed by Foreign Partners, San Diego L. 
Rev. 1123, 1135–36 (1998), and Carol E. Head, Note, The Dormant Foreign Affairs Power: 
Constitutional Implications for State and Local Investment Restrictions Impacting Foreign Countries, 
42 B.C. L. Rev. 123, 127-34 (2000). 
15 Some commentators argue that states can and should play a signiªcant role in pro-
tecting human rights in a federal democracy. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 9. Others trum-
pet the role of courts—especially federal courts—in upholding rights. See, e.g., Paust, supra 
note 11. It is not the purpose of this Article to debate whether states or courts have the 
greater contribution to make to protecting rights. Sufªce to say that, now that states have 
been circumscribed in their protective role, see supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text, it is 
all the more important that courts are vigilant in upholding rights to ensure a check and 
balance against a majoritarian federal government. 
16 Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924) (“Treaties are to be construed in 
a broad and liberal spirit, and, when two constructions are possible, one restrictive of 
rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable to them, the latter is to be 
preferred.”). 
17 More recent peace treaties that have contained waivers or immunities for human 
rights violations include the 1991 Paris Peace Accords with respect to Cambodia, Final Act 
of the Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. 
A/46/608 & s/23177 (1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 180, 186 (1992), the 1995 Oslo Accords 
with respect to Israel and the Palestinian Council, Interim Agreement on the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.-PLO, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 551 (1997), the Guatema-
lan 1996 Ley de Reconciliación, Law of National Reconciliation, Decree Number 145-96, 
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 In particular, this Article demonstrates that, in rejecting the 
forced laborers’ claims on account of Article 14(b) of the 1951 Treaty, 
the courts neglected to properly examine the validity and scope of 
Article 14(b) of the 1951 Treaty. It is argued that the courts had 
strong grounds to declare Article 14(b) invalid under both interna-
tional law18 and domestic constitutional law because of the severe, 
rights-based implications of Article 14(b). Yet it also must be acknowl-
edged that political considerations strongly deter judicial invalidation 
of treaty provisions, even if those provisions condone gross violations 
of human rights. Accordingly, this Article suggests how courts can un-
dertake their examination of treaty provisions in a manner that takes 
into account these realpolitik considerations while also maintaining 
their historical role as guardians of individual rights. Speciªcally, 
courts could, and should, adopt rights-based interpretive approaches 
in construing the scope of treaty provisions, which would involve 
identifying any ambiguities in such provisions and resolving such am-
biguities in favor of those whose rights have been infringed. 
 Part I of this Article comprises a brief historical background to 
the relevant issues in the Japanese forced labor litigation and a brief 
                                                                                                                      
adopted by the Congress of the Republic of Guatemala, Dec. 18, 1996, arts. 1-7, (Law of 
National Reconciliation), and the 1999 Sierra Leone Peace Accord, Peace Agreement be-
tween the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Le-
one, signed in Lome, Togo, May 18, 1999. For example, Article XX(1)(a) of the 1995 Oslo 
II (Interim) Accord states as follows: 
[t]he transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military govern-
ment and its civil administration to the Council, as detailed in Annex III, in-
cludes all related rights, liabilities and obligations arising with regard to acts 
or omissions which occurred prior to such transfer. Israel will cease to bear 
any ªnancial responsibility regarding such acts or omissions and the Council 
will bear all ªnancial responsibility for these and for its own functioning. 
Id. 
Article IX(3) of the 1999 Sierra Leone Peace Accord provided that: 
[t]o consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation, 
the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no ofªcial or judicial ac-
tion is taken against any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in 
respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of 
those organisations, since March 1991, up to the time of the signing of the 
present Agreement. In addition, legislative and other measures necessary to 
guarantee immunity to former combatants, exiles and other persons, cur-
rently outside the country for reasons related to the armed conºict shall be 
adopted . . . . 
Id. 
18 The grounds for Article 14(b)’s invalidity would be international law as it is applied 
in U.S. courts. 
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account of Section 354.6 and the case law that followed it. In Part II, 
the validity of Article 14(b) is critically assessed, from an international 
law perspective as well as from a domestic constitutional perspective. 
Part III contains an exploration of the political considerations at stake 
in the Japanese forced labor cases, as a means of understanding why 
the courts were reluctant to invalidate Article 14(b). In Part IV, the 
author ªrst discusses several ambiguities in the text of Article 14(b). 
The author examines the utility of interpretive methods in protecting 
rights while still taking into account political considerations, and pre-
sents three distinct, rights-based interpretative approaches which 
could be adopted to resolve such ambiguities. Finally, in Part V, the 
application of these interpretive approaches is exempliªed by demon-
strating how they could have been employed to resolve one of the 
starker ambiguities in the meaning of Article 14(b). 
I. Background 
 A striking aspect of the Japanese forced labor litigation is that the 
courts inquired primarily into the legal, rather than factual, aspects of 
the plaintiffs’ claims.19 At the outset of each case, the courts largely 
accepted the veracity of the plaintiffs’ harrowing stories of forced la-
bor at the hands of the defendants,20 stories which mirror the nu-
merous historical accounts of forced labor in wartime Japan.21 Thus it 
was uncontested that the claims of the plaintiffs in the Section 354.6 
litigation implicated grave violations of human rights.22 In Deutsch, for 
example, Circuit Judge Reinhardt described how corporations and 
their managers, with the cooperation and encouragement of their 
governments, subjected many individuals to vicious cruelties and 
forced them to work long hours without pay. The slave workers were 
often underfed, physically beaten, exposed to dangerous conditions, 
                                                                                                                      
19 See Deutsch II, 324 F.3d at 703 (“Plaintiffs-Appellants . . . seek damages and other 
remedies for lost wages and for other atrocious injuries they suffered in the course of their 
forced labor.”); In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d 939, 
942 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (“Japanese Forced Labor Litig. I”) (“James King is one of the plaintiffs in 
these actions against Japanese corporations for forced labor in World War II; his experi-
ence, and the undisputed injustice he suffered, are representative.”) (emphasis added). 
20 See Deutsch II, 324 F.3d at 703–06; Japanese Forced Labor Litig. I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 942. 
21 See, e.g., James L. McClain, Japan: A Modern History 489, 497 (2002); Gary K. 
Reynolds, Congressional Research Serv., U.S. Prisoners of War and Civilian Ameri-
can Citizens Captured and Interned by Japan in World War II: The Issue of Compen-
sation by Japan 2, 10–12 ( July 27, 2001), available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/ 
RL30606.pdf. 
22 See Deutsch II, 324 F.3d at 703–06; Japanese Forced Labor Litig. I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 942. 
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and denied medical care.23 Furthermore, many were murdered, and 
others died as a result of the maltreatment they suffered.24 In Taiheiyo 
Cement Corp. v. Superior Court,25 the California Court of Appeal heard 
the claim of a former Korean forced laborer, and described the cir-
cumstances of the plaintiff, Jae Won Jeong, as follows: “[r]efusing to 
join the Japanese military, Jeong was taken to a slave labor camp in 
Korea operated by a Japanese cement company. Along with other Ko-
rean nationals, Jeong was subjected to physical and mental torture 
and forced to perform physical labor without compensation . . . .”26
 Japan captured approximately 27,000 U.S. POWs and 140,000 
Allied POWs in total.27 Historians have estimated that by 1945, as 
many as 50,000 Allied POWs, 30,000 Chinese, and between 600,000 
and 1 million Koreans were forced to labor for Japanese industry, fre-
quently in the most dangerous and arduous of industries, such as coal 
mining, in which Japanese men and women were reluctant to work.28 
It has been estimated that 38.2% of U.S. POWs in Japan died in cap-
tivity, although it is unclear precisely how many of these deaths are 
attributable to forced labor.29 By contrast, a little over 1% of U.S. 
POWs died while in German wartime captivity.30
 The surrender of Japan on August 15, 1945, following the United 
States’ use of atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Na-
gasaki,31 and the subsequent occupied rule of Japan for seven years 
under the leadership of General MacArthur,32 eventually led to the 
signing of the 1951 Treaty. The terms of the Treaty, which took effect 
                                                                                                                      
23 Deutsch II, 324 F.3d at 704. 
24 Id. 
25 Taiheiyo Cement Corp. v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) 
(“Taiheiyo I”). The decision preceded, and was contradicted by, the decision of the Ninth 
Circuit in Deutsch II. In Taiheiyo I, the court agreed that the 1951 Treaty barred the claims 
of plaintiffs from signatory nations, but afªrmed the constitutionality of Section 354.6 with 
respect to plaintiffs from non-signatory nations, thereby upholding the claim of a Korean 
victim of forced labor made pursuant to Section 354.6. This decision was later vacated, 
however, in Taiheiyo Cement Corp. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), 
where the court reconsidered their decision in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003), and held that Section 354.6 
was, after all, unconstitutional and preempted by the 1951 Treaty. See 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 42. 
26 Taiheiyo I, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454. 
27 Reynolds, supra note 21, at 2, 12. 
28 McClain, supra note 21, at 489. 
29 Reynolds, supra note 21, at 11. 
30 Id. 
31 The United States dropped a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and on 
Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. 
32 Colin Mason, A Short History of Asia 240 (2000). 
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on April 28, 1952, were not designed to punish Japan for its wartime 
role nor to exact heavy reparations from it, but rather to pave the way 
for Japan’s future economic prosperity and political stability, which 
would ensure its status as a U.S. and Western ally.33 It was, apparently, 
with this objective in mind, that the United States and other Western 
Allied Powers agreed to the waiver set forth in Article 14(b) of the 
1951 Treaty.34
 In enacting Section 354.6 almost half a century later, the Califor-
nian legislature was not seeking to override the terms of the 1951 
Treaty, nor even to provide a means of legal redress to victims of 
Japanese forced labor.35 Rather, the foremost objective of the legisla-
tors was to assist the cause of slave and forced labor victims in Ger-
many and other European countries during World War II, whose ne-
gotiations with German companies for war reparations had come to a 
standstill.36 But when a mass settlement of claims against German in-
dustry and government was achieved in December 1999, and against 
the Austrian industry and government in October 2000, Section 354.6 
essentially became obsolete with regard to German and other Euro-
                                                                                                                      
33 See McClain, supra note 21, at 556. 
34 See 1951 Treaty, supra note 4, art. 14(a), 3 U.S.T. at 3180–90, 136 U.N.T.S. at 60–61 
(recognizing explicitly “that the resources of Japan are not presently sufªcient, if it is to 
maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation”); Japanese Forced Labor Litig. I, 
114 F. Supp. 2d at 946–47. Limited compensation was granted to certain categories of war 
victims from Allied nations. In the United States, the War Claims Act of 1948 established 
the War Claims Commission (WCC), see Reynolds, supra note 21, at 3, which paid Ameri-
can POWs between $1 and $2.50 per day of imprisonment and paid limited types of civil-
ian American internees $60 per month of detention. Id. at 6–7. However, substantial cate-
gories of former war victims and forced laborers were excluded from the WCC scheme. 
These included several thousand POWs in U.S. territories (e.g. Filipino POWs) and U.S. 
civilians interned in most Asian countries who had received State Department warnings to 
leave those countries. For further details on the WCC scheme, see id. at 3–9. More re-
cently, forced laborers have pursued legal and political means to obtain additional com-
pensation, especially after Congress approved granting $20,000 to Japanese-Americans 
detained in the United States during World War II. See Civil Liberties Act of 1998, 50 
U.S.C. § 1989b-4 (2000). Thus, POWs and civilian internees ªled suit in Japanese courts in 
1995 for a net individual payment of $20,000, but the Japanese courts refused these claims, 
citing Article 14(b) of the 1951 Treaty. Reynolds, supra note 21, at Summary. Several bills 
have been unsuccessfully introduced in Congress to provide additional compensation to 
forced laborers. Id. at 21–23. Currently, a bill entitled the “Justice for United States Prison-
ers of War Act of 2003,” which directs courts not to interpret Article 14(b) as a bar to 
forced laborers’ claims for compensation, is being considered by Congress. See Justice for 
United States Prisoners of War Act of 2003, H.R. 1864, 108th Cong. (2003). 
35 See Michael J. Bayzler, The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective, 20 
Berkeley J. Int’l L. 11, 26–27 n.67 (2002). 
36 See id. There is a distinction between “slave labor” and “forced labor.” See supra note 3. 
308 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 28:299 
pean slave and forced labor victims and, consequently, became of 
greatest use to victims of Japanese forced labor.37
 Following the implementation of Section 354.6, several cases 
were ªled by former POWs and civilian internees of various nationali-
ties against Japanese corporations who were alleged to have engaged 
forced labor.38 Most of these cases were ªled in state courts, but were 
then removed to and consolidated in the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California, where they were heard by 
Judge Vaughn Walker.39 In the ªrst of a series of decisions, Judge 
Walker denied the claims of the plaintiffs who were former U.S. and 
Allied POWs in In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation40 
(Japanese Forced Labor Litigation (2000)), on the basis that the claims 
were incompatible with the 1951 Treaty.41 The district court looked 
speciªcally to Article 14(b) of the 1951 Treaty and held that, as the 
plaintiffs were former members of the U.S. and other Allied armed 
forces, Article 14(b) constituted a clear waiver of their claims.42
 Judge Walker left open, however, the question of the impact of 
Article 14(b) on the claims of plaintiffs who were not former U.S. or 
Allied POWs.43 He addressed that question a year later in the cases of 
In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation (Filipinos)44 and In 
re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation 45 (Japanese Forced La-
bor Litigation (2001)). In the former case, Judge Walker determined 
that, although the Filipino plaintiffs were not former U.S. or Allied 
                                                                                                                      
37 See Bayzler, supra note 35, at 22–25, 27. 
38 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
39 See, e.g., Deutsch II, 324 F.3d at 705–06; Bayzler, supra note 35, at 27; Brannon P. Den-
ning, International Decision: American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi and Deutsch v. Turner 
Corp., 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 950, 955 (2003). 
40 Japanese Forced Labor Litig. I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
41 Id. at 945. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 942. The court stated the following: 
This order does not address the pending motions to dismiss in cases brought 
by plaintiffs who were not members of the armed forces of the United States 
or its allies. Since these plaintiffs are not citizens of countries that are signato-
ries of the 1951 treaty, their claims raise a host of issues not presented by the 
Allied POW cases and, therefore, require further consideration in further 
proceedings. 
Id. 
44 In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (N.D. Cal. 
2001) (“Japanese Forced Labor Litig. II”). 
45 In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 
2001) (“Japanese Forced Labor Litig. III”). 
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soldiers, their claims were nevertheless barred by Article 14(b) be-
cause the Philippines, having signed and ratiªed the 1951 Treaty, was 
an “Allied Power” pursuant to the terms of the Treaty.46 In Japanese 
Forced Labor Litigation (2001), Judge Walker decided that, by contrast, 
Article 14(b) did not bar the claims of plaintiffs of Korean and Chi-
nese descent because neither Korea nor China were signatories to the 
1951 Treaty.47 Those plaintiffs’ claims, however, were denied nonethe-
less.48 Judge Walker held that Section 354.6 of the California Code of 
Civil Procedure was an unconstitutional infringement on the exclu-
sive foreign affairs power of the federal government of the United 
States,49 and that the plaintiffs’ remaining claims pursuant to the Fed-
eral Alien Tort Claims Act50 (ATCA) were time-barred.51
 The appeals of plaintiffs in all of the aforementioned cases were 
heard and dismissed in Deutsch, where the Ninth Circuit reiterated that 
Section 354.6 amounted to an “unconstitutional intrusion on the for-
eign affairs power of the United States,”52 and that the forced laborers’ 
remaining claims pursuant to the ATCA and the Torture Victims Pro-
tection Act53 were time-barred.54 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held 
that Article 14(b) of the 1951 Treaty barred all reparations claims in 
U.S. courts, even by claimants who were not nationals of parties to the 
1951 Treaty.55 However, just a week prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
in Deutsch, the California Court of Appeal in Taiheiyo had taken a mark-
                                                                                                                      
46 See Japanese Forced Labor Litig. II, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1157. The Philippines was named 
in Article 23 of the 1951 Treaty as a state to which the Treaty would be presented for signa-
ture and ratiªcation. 1951 Treaty, supra note 4, art. 23, 3 U.S.T. at 3189, 136 U.N.T.S. at 74. 
Article 25 of the 1951 Treaty states that “the Allied Powers shall be the States at war with 
Japan, or any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in 
Article 23, provided that in each case the State concerned has signed and ratiªed the 
Treaty.” Id. art. 25, 3 U.S.T. at 3190, 136 U.N.T.S. at 74. 
47 See Japanese Forced Labor Litig. III, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1165–68. 
48 Id. at 1168 (“Simply because the claims of the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs derived 
from section 354.6 are not preempted by the Treaty of Peace with Japan does not mean 
that they can go forward, however.”). 
49 Id. at 1168–78. 
50 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
51 See Japanese Forced Labor Litig. III, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1179–82. 
52 Deutsch II, 324 F.3d at 719. The Ninth Circuit held that Section 354.6 also infringed 
the exclusive power of the federal government in matters relating to war. According to the 
Ninth Circuit, “the Constitution allocates the power over foreign affairs to the federal gov-
ernment exclusively, and the power to make and resolve war, including the authority to 
resolve war claims, is central to the foreign affairs power in the constitutional design.” Id. 
at 713–14. 
53 Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
54 See Deutsch II, 324 F.3d at 716–18. 
55 See id. at 714 n.14. 
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edly different approach. While the California Court of Appeal agreed 
that the 1951 Treaty barred the claims of plaintiffs from signatory na-
tions, it afªrmed the constitutionality of Section 354.6 with respect to 
plaintiffs from non-signatory nations, thus upholding the claim of a 
Korean victim of forced labor made pursuant to Section 354.6.56 The 
Supreme Court’s refusal in October 2003 to hear an appeal of the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Deutsch, however, made clear that the deci-
sion in Deutsch, rather than in Taiheiyo, prevails.57
II. Validity of Article 14(b) of the 1951 Treaty of  
Peace with Japan 
 Article 14(b) of the 1951 Treaty is typical of a so-called “waiver 
clause” in a peace treaty, in that it purports to waive or otherwise pre-
vent civil claims by a state and its nationals (potential plaintiffs) 
against another state and its nationals (potential defendants).58 A 
fundamental question, however, is whether a state can waive claims of 
reparative justice on behalf of its nationals, including its private citi-
zens. In other words, is Article 14(b) even a legally valid treaty provi-
sion, either under international law or domestic constitutional law? 
Judge Walker in Japanese Forced Labor Litigation (2000) determined 
that, under domestic law, the federal government can indeed waive 
the claims of its citizens against another state and that state’s nation-
als, and thereby afªrmed the legality of Article 14(b).59 Judge Walker 
looked to the decision of the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v. Re-
gan60 as clear authority for this view.61 In that case, Justice Rehnquist 
stated: 
                                                                                                                      
56 See generally Taiheiyo I, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451, 472 (upholding the claims of plaintiffs 
from nonsignatory nations). 
57 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
58 See supra note 17 for examples of other peace treaties that contain waiver clauses. A 
waiver clause is also sometimes referred to as an “immunity clause,” although there ap-
pears to be a technical distinction between the two types of clauses. It would seem that an 
immunity clause purports to grant immunity from criminal prosecution, while a waiver 
clause purports to prevent civil claims. 
59 Japanese Forced Labor Litig. I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 948. 
60 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
61 Japanese Forced Labor Litig. I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 948. In reaching the conclusion that 
the federal government can waive the claims of its citizens, Judge Walker relied heavily 
upon the views of the U.S. government as they were reºected in statements of interest and 
elsewhere. See, e.g., Japanese Forced Labor Litig. III, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1176; Japanese Forced 
Labor Litig. I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 948. 
2005] Rights-Based Approaches to Waiver Clauses 311 
Not infrequently in affairs between nations, outstanding 
claims by nationals of one country against the government 
of another country are “sources of friction” between the two 
sovereigns. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 225 (1942). To 
resolve these difªculties, nations have often entered into 
agreements settling the claims of their respective nationals.62
 Judge Walker’s conclusion, however, warrants further scrutiny. At 
the outset, it is instructive to consider whether a state can waive the 
claims of its nationals for human rights abuses under customary in-
ternational law. This is not an esoteric consideration, given that there 
is judicial and academic authority for the view that international law, 
whether part of customary international law or self-executing trea-
ties,63 is automatically part of U.S. law.64 There are two divergent 
strands of this view. The stricter form of this view is that international 
law is directly applicable by U.S. judges and thus a treaty or statutory 
provision which is invalid under later-developed customary interna-
tional law would have no effect in U.S. courts.65 In its more lenient 
form, the view that international law is part of U.S. law holds that leg-
islative and executive acts should be construed in light of international 
law, and accordingly, courts should endeavor to interpret treaties in a 
                                                                                                                      
62 Regan, 453 U.S. at 679. 
63 See Amy K. Rehm, Casenote, International Law: The Supreme Court Rules on Government 
Authorized Abduction--United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (Interim Ed. 1992), 18 
U. Dayton L. Rev. 889, 916 n.230 (1993) (“Customary international law is self-executing 
and therefore enforceable in United States courts.”). 
64 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). In The Paquete Habana, the Supreme 
Court stated that “[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and ad-
ministered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right 
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.” Id.; see Murray v. Schooner 
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). Regarding the substance of interna-
tional law to be applied by U.S. courts, the Second Circuit has opined that “it is clear that 
courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as has evolved and exists 
among the nations of the world today.” Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 
1980). Commentators who have supported the view that international law is automatically 
part of U.S. law include Professor Paust, who stated that “the customary law of nations is 
part of the law of the United States, even with respect to private duties.” Paust, supra note 
11, at 336. As a logical extension of the later-in-time rule expounded in Reid v. Covert, 354 
U.S. 1 (1957), that in case of inconsistency between a treaty and statute, the most recent 
one must prevail, Professor Henkin, among others, has argued that newly developed cus-
tomary international law would also prevail over earlier statutes and treaties, assuming that 
the United States has been party to its development and Congress has not indicated rejec-
tion of such law. Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States. 82 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1555, 1563–69 (1984). 
65 For a defense of this view, see Henkin, supra note 64, at 1561, 1564–65. 
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manner which does not conºict with customary international law.66 
Yet neither Judge Walker, nor the courts in Taiheiyo and Deutsch, 
paused to consider the validity or meaning of Article 14(b) from the 
perspective of international law.67
A. Validity of Waiver Clauses Under International Law 
 International law consists primarily of rules contained in treaties 
and rules forming part of customary international law.68 A state is 
bound by every treaty to which it is a party, but it is usually permitted to 
disavow a rule of customary international law; for example, by consis-
tently objecting to a customary rule or by ratifying a treaty which per-
mits or mandates divergence from the rule.69 However, there exists a 
special category of customary international law known as jus cogens 
norms (for example, the norms prohibiting genocide and torture), 
from which no divergence is permitted.70 Jus cogens norms, which are 
also known as “peremptory norms,” are regarded as inalienable.71 Ac-
cordingly, states always are bound by them and moreover, a treaty can-
                                                                                                                      
66 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law: Cases and 
Materials (2003) (stating that it is unlikely that “international law is part of our law,” but 
acknowledging that an “interpretive role is where customary international law may have its 
most signiªcant effect in the U.S. legal system”). 
67 There is no discussion in Deutsch II or Taiheiyo I as to the validity or meaning of Arti-
cle 14(b) under international law. See generally Deutsch II, 324 F.3d 692; Taiheiyo I, 129 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 451 (both cases lacking treatment of the subject). In Japanese Forced Labor Litigation 
I, Judge Walker notes plaintiffs’ argument “that waiver of plaintiffs’ claims renders the 
treaty unconstitutional and invalid under international law” but does not address the in-
ternational law component of this argument. 114 F. Supp. 2d at 948. 
68 Customary international rules are norms that nation states both (1) actually prac-
tice, and (2) accept as legally binding. The ªrst of these two requirements is commonly 
referred to as usus and the latter is known as opinio juris. See Ian Brownlie, Principles of 
Public International Law 4–9 (5th ed. 1998); Wesley A. Caan, Jr., On the Relationship 
Between Intellectual Property Rights and the Need of Less-Developed Countries for Access to Pharma-
ceuticals, 25 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 755, 912 (2004). Pursuant to Article 38(1) of the Stat-
ute of the International Court of Justice, “the general principles of law” constitute a third 
source of international law, aside from treaties and custom. Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(c), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, annexed to U.N. Char-
ter. 
69 See Brownlie, supra note 68, at 10, 12–13. 
70 See id., at 514–15; see also United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 764 n.5 (9th 
Cir. 1995). Note, however, that some commentators disagree that jus cogens norms consti-
tute part of customary international law. See, e.g., Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and 
Modern Approaches to Customary International Law, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 757, 783 (2001). 
71 Brownlie, supra note 68, at 514–16; V. D. Degan, Sources of International Law 
217, 226 (1997). 
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not contain any provision that conºicts with such norms.72 Article 53 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties73 (VCLT) thus states: 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conºicts 
with a peremptory norm of general international law. For 
the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm 
of general international law is a norm accepted and recog-
nized by the international community of States as a whole as 
a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which 
can be modiªed only by a subsequent norm of general in-
ternational law having the same character.74
Article 64 of the VCLT similarly provides that a treaty is void if it 
conºicts with a norm which attains jus cogens status after the treaty en-
ters into force.75
 The least controversial peremptory norms include the law of 
genocide, the principle of racial non-discrimination, and the prohibi-
tion against slavery.76 The prohibition against forced labor was, at the 
time the 1951 Treaty entered into force in 1952, an undisputed norm 
of treaty law as well as of customary international law.77 The 1929 
Convention on Prisoners of War78 and the 1949 Third Geneva Con-
vention79 prohibited states from using POWs as forced laborers, and 
the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention No. 29 of 
                                                                                                                      
72 See Brownlie, supra note 68, at 516; Degan, supra note 71, at 217, 226. 
73 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [here-
inafter VCLT]. The VCLT was signed, but not ratiªed, by the United States. See id. Never-
theless, its provisions are widely accepted as part of customary law and have been cited by 
U.S. courts on numerous occasions. See, e.g., State v. Pang, 940 P.2d 1293, 1322 n.88 (Wash. 
1997) (stating that “although the United States has not ratiªed this treaty, it is accepted as 
the authoritative guide to treaty law and practice and declaratory of customary interna-
tional law”). 
74 VCLT, supra note 73, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344. 
75 Id. art. 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347 (“If a new peremptory norm of general interna-
tional law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conºict with that norm becomes void 
and terminates.”). 
76 For a list of established jus cogens norms see Brownlie, supra note 68, at 515. For a 
discussion on the peremptory norm against slavery, see Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internali-
zation and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 26–27 (2001). 
77 See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 440 (D.N.J. 1999) (“The use of 
unpaid, forced labor during World War II violated clearly established norms of customary 
international law.”). For an identiªcation of treaties prohibiting forced labor at the time 
the 1951 Treaty entered into force, see notes 78–80 infra and accompanying text. 
78 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 
2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343. 
79 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
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1930 contained similar proscriptions on using civilian forced labor-
ers.80 By analogy to the prohibition against slavery, the prohibition 
against forced labor is now also widely accepted as a jus cogens norm, 
both in judicial and academic commentary.81 The ILO has also re-
cently described forced labor as a violation of a jus cogens norm.82 At 
the least, forced labor can be regarded as violating a jus cogens norm 
when it is practiced in a manner equivalent to slavery; signiªed, for 
example, by imposing forced labor for an indeªnite amount of time 
(thereby presuming ownership rights by the perpetrator and a loss of 
personhood of the victim) and in highly abusive conditions, as almost 
invariably occurred in wartime Japan.83
 As Article 14(b) purportedly prevents compensation for forced 
labor, certain commentators have argued that Article 14(b) conºicts 
with a jus cogens norm and is therefore void.84 However, it must be 
recognized that waiver clauses like Article 14(b) do not per se permit 
                                                                                                                      
80 Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 
55 (ratiªed by 164 countries, including Japan). Article 4 provides that: “The competent 
authority shall not impose or permit the imposition of forced or compulsory labour for 
the beneªt of private individuals, companies or associations.” Id. art. 4, 39 U.N.T.S. at 58–
59. 
81 See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 76, at 27. In identifying jus cogens norms, Cleveland 
states that the “prohibition against slavery reasonably may be read to include the prohibi-
tion against forced and bonded labor.” Id.; see also Japanese Forced Labor Litig. III, 164 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1179 (“Given the Ninth Circuit’s comment . . . that slavery constitutes a viola-
tion of jus cogens, this court is inclined to agree . . . that forced labor violates the law of 
nations.”). For a contrary view that appears to be in the minority, see Pia Zara Thadhani, 
Regulating Corporate Human Rights Abuses: Is Unocal the Answer?, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
619, 633–34 (2000) (“Forced labor involves involuntary and abusive conduct, however, 
unlike slavery, it does not involve ownership rights in other human beings. This is not to 
say that forced labor should be condoned under any standard, but if allowed, this 
deªnitional ºexibility might lead U.S. courts to sanction deviant conduct that does not rise 
to the level of a jus cogens violation.”). 
82 See Int’l Labour Org., Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma), para. 538 ( July 2, 1998), 
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/myanmar. 
htm (stating that the practice of forced labor violates a jus cogens norm). 
83 See Nat’l Coalition Gov’t of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 353 (C.D. Cal. 
1997) (“With respect to allegations of forced labor, although the parties have not yet fully 
briefed the issue, for purposes of the pending motion, the Court concludes that the allega-
tions of forced labor raise the potential that plaintiffs could state a claim for slavery or slave 
trading, which appear to be jus cogens violations.” (emphasis added)). 
84 Karolyn A. Eilers, Article 14(b) of the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan: Interpretation and 
Effect on POWs’ Claims Against Japanese Corporations, 11 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 
469, 479 (2001); see also Karen Parker & Jennifer F. Chew, Compensation for Japan’s World 
War II War-Rape Victims, 17 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 497, 538 (1994) (arguing that 
Article 14(b) is void if it “effectively nulliªes . . . jus cogens rights or allows violations of jus 
cogens to go uncompensated”). 
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or condone forced labor.85 Rather, Article 14(b) waives the right to 
claim for compensation or reparations for forced labor “in the course 
of the prosecution of the war.”86 A pertinent question, therefore, is 
whether a peremptory norm encompasses the right to compensation 
for a violation of that norm. Put in the language of Article 53 of the 
VCLT,87 is a government’s purported waiver of individual claims for 
compensation for a violation of a peremptory norm in “conºict with” 
that peremptory norm, and therefore void? There is no authoritative 
case law or commentary on this issue,88 but it has been argued that a 
treaty which bars compensation claims for forced labor, or any other 
violation of a jus cogens norm, is void under international law because 
it frustrates the very purpose and realization of that norm.89 Indeed, 
this argument is particularly forceful with respect to treaty provisions 
that bar compensation for violations of the jus cogens norms prohibit-
                                                                                                                      
85 See 1951 Treaty, supra note 4, art. 14(b), 3 U.S.T. at 3183, 136 U.N.T.S. at 64. 
86 Id. 
87 See VCLT, supra note 73, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344. 
88 The most relevant case law and commentary addresses whether the international 
norm of sovereign immunity precludes claims against a state or other sovereign entity for a 
violation of jus cogens norms. The majority of relevant U.S. and international cases have 
upheld sovereign immunity as a defense against such claims for jus cogens violations. See, 
e.g., Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Controller and 
Auditor Gen. v. Davison [1996] 2 N.Z.L.R. 278; Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2002-34 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 1751 (2001). At least two factors, however, argue against using these cases as 
precedent for upholding the validity of a treaty provision which waives claims against a 
state and its nationals. Most obviously, the defense of sovereign immunity is only available 
to states or state-owned entities, not to private corporations or other non-state actors. See 
Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It 78–
79 (1994). Secondly, the application of the defense of sovereign immunity appears to be 
narrowing, as courts and legislators try to balance it with human rights concerns. Thus, 
there is some authority for the view that sovereign immunity does not bar criminal prose-
cutions for jus cogens norms. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate Ex. P. Pi-
nochet Ugarte, [2000] A.C. 147. Even in civil suits, the defense of sovereign immunity has 
been held inapplicable when the state entity was acting qua private party (i.e. de jure ges-
tionis, as distinct from jus imperii or public law authority) when violating jus cogens norms. 
See Ilias Bantekas, State Responsibility in Private Civil Action--Sovereign Immunity--Immunity for 
Jus Cogens Violations--Belligerent Occupation--Peace Treaties, 92 Am. J. Int’l L. 765 (1998). 
89 Eilers, supra note 84, at 487. Note that such a ªnding would not necessarily render 
the 1951 Treaty void. According to established principles of interpretation, Article 14(b) 
should be interpreted to the extent possible to be compatible with international law and 
especially with international human rights. See infra Part IV. Even where it is impossible to 
reconcile the treaty provision with international law, the offending provision may be sever-
able. As noted by Brownlie, pursuant to Article 44 of the VCLT, severability may be possible 
where a norm crystallizes to a jus cogens status after the conclusion of a treaty, as appears to 
be the case with the norm prohibiting forced labor with respect to the 1951 Treaty. See 
Brownlie, supra note 68, at 627. But severability may not be possible in practice. See infra 
note 145. 
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ing forced labor or slavery. Unlike with other jus cogens norms, such as 
those prohibiting torture or genocide, the absence of due compensa-
tion is intrinsic to the violation of norms prohibiting forced labor or 
slavery because such absence partly evidences the lack of a consensual 
employment relationship. 
 Of course, while a waiver of legal claims for a violation of a jus 
cogens norm is likely to frustrate the purpose and realization of that 
norm (and therefore be void), this is not always the case. Some or all 
of the parties who agreed to the waiver may have provided alternative 
means of redressing those violations, for example, by establishing a 
substantial fund to comprehensively compensate the victims.90 The 
most judicious approach for courts would be to take into account the 
sufªciency and comprehensiveness of such alternative means of re-
dress to determine whether the operation of the waiver provision does 
in fact frustrate the jus cogens norm against forced labor. If the parties 
have established sufªcient and comprehensive alternative measures to 
compensate the would-be claimants, a court could reasonably uphold 
the waiver provision.91
 At a minimum, the courts in the Japanese Forced Labor Litigation 
cases, Taiheiyo, and Deutsch were remiss not to address the validity of 
Article 14(b) on the ground of international law as it applies in U.S. 
courts.92 But had they undertaken such an inquiry, they plausibly 
would have found that Article 14(b) was invalid under international 
law for “conºicting with” a jus cogens norm; speciªcally, the norm 
prohibiting forced labor.93 Although Article 14(b) does not directly 
permit violation of this jus cogens norm, it appears to frustrate the 
                                                                                                                      
90 As noted earlier, the absence of compensation is not intrinsic to the violation of jus 
cogens norms other than the prohibitions on slavery and forced labor. With respect to these 
other jus cogens norms, such as the prohibition on torture or genocide, sufªcient alterna-
tive means of redress may include non-compensatory measures, such as the creation of a 
human rights or “truth and reconciliation” commission to investigate those violations, or 
prosecution by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
91 To expand on the test provided by Eilers, that a provision which defeats the purpose 
of a jus cogens norm is void, sufªcient and comprehensive compensation would avoid frus-
trating the “purpose and realization” of the norm prohibiting forced labor. See Eilers, supra 
note 84, at 484–90. 
92 See generally Deutsch II, 324 F. 3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003); Japanese Forced Labor Litig. I, 114 
F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Taiheiyo I, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (all 
neglecting to discuss the subject). 
93 See supra notes 81–89 and accompanying text. 
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purpose and realization of the norm in the absence of sufªcient and 
comprehensive alternative means of redress.94
B. Federal, Executive Power to Waive Claims of U.S. Nationals 
 Aside from the standpoint of international law, it is highly con-
tentious whether Article 14(b) is constitutionally valid under U.S. 
law.95 In this respect, Judge Walker (although not the courts in Tai-
heiyo and Deutsch)96 at least addressed the issue of whether Article 
14(b) overstepped the constitutional bounds of treaty-making.97 How-
ever, as is shown in the following paragraphs, the district court relied 
on inapt judicial precedent in concluding that Article 14(b) was a 
constitutionally valid treaty provision. Judge Walker could not cite any 
judicial precedent to support the validity of a treaty provision which 
waived individual claims against a corporation (rather than a country), 
especially where those claims were based on human rights violations.98
 Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides 
that the President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Sena-
tors present concur . . . .”99 It is well-settled that there are constitu-
tional limits to this treaty-making power. As the Supreme Court held 
over a century ago in De Geofroy v. Riggs: “[t]he treaty power, as ex-
pressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those re-
straints which are found in that instrument against the action of the 
                                                                                                                      
94 The federal government did establish the WCC scheme in 1948. See supra note 34 
and accompanying text. This would not, however, appear to qualify as a “sufªcient and 
comprehensive” alternative means of redress. Even if compensation of between $1 and 
$2.50 a day paid under the WCC scheme was deemed sufªcient compensation in real 
terms (taking into account the ªscal standards of the time), it was hardly comprehensive, 
given that the scheme did not provide compensation for many of the plaintiffs in the Cali-
fornian forced labor litigation (for example, Filipino POWs). 
95 See infra notes 100–125 and accompanying text. 
96 The issue presumably was not considered in Taiheiyo I because the court determined 
that the 1951 Treaty was inapplicable to the plaintiff’s claims, as he was not a national of a 
country which became party to the 1951 Treaty at the time it came into effect. See Taiheiyo 
I, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 458–60. In Deutsch I, the Ninth Circuit considered the 1951 Treaty 
more as an exercise of the federal government’s war powers, rather than of the treaty-
making power, and the court simply appeared to assume the provisions of the 1951 Treaty 
were within the scope of these war powers. See Deutsch I, 317 F.3d at 1023–24. 
97 See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
98 See Japanese Forced Labor Litig. I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 948 (relying on Regan, 453 U.S. 
654, which concerned commercial claims rather than human rights-based claims). 
99 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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government or of its departments, and those arising from the nature 
of the government itself and of that of the States.”100
 In rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments that the United States could 
not constitutionally waive claims of its nationals against foreign gov-
ernments and their nationals, Judge Walker in Japanese Forced Labor 
Litigation (2000) referred to the Supreme Court’s statement in Regan 
that the United States has repeatedly exercised its “sovereign author-
ity to settle the claims of its nationals against foreign countries.”101 
However, there are key distinctions between the decision in Regan and 
the cases relating to Section 354.6, particularly concerning the type of 
claims which were at issue. Most obviously, the claims before Judge 
Walker and the courts in Taiheiyo and Deutsch were not against the 
country of Japan, nor any of its ofªcials or government entities, but 
against private corporations incorporated or constituted in Japan.102 
Additionally, in upholding the executive’s nulliªcation of claims 
against Iran, the Court in Regan placed weight on the fact that the 
President had “provided an alternative forum, the [Iran-United 
States] Claims Tribunal, which is capable of providing meaningful 
relief” and would possibly “enhance the opportunity for claimants to 
recover their claims.”103 Such a meaningful alternative forum was not 
provided to the forced labor litigants whose claims purportedly were 
waived by Article 14(b).104 Moreover, the petitioners’ claims in Regan 
implicated commercial or proprietary interests, as distinct from the 
serious human rights considerations which were raised by the plain-
tiffs’ claims in the Section 354.6 cases.105 These distinctions and their 
intersection with one another are further considered below. 
 Since the Supreme Court in Regan only determined the validity 
of agreements which settled claims against other countries, the case 
                                                                                                                      
100 De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (emphasis added). While there is also 
plenty of judicial authority in support of a wide treaty-making power, this has generally 
been provided in cases where the power has been weighed against states’ rights. The ambit 
of the power has not been conclusively determined where it conºicts with fundamental 
human rights, especially rights that are not speciªcally protected in the Constitution. 
Thus, the Second Circuit in United States v. Wang Kun Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1998), 
recognized that “[a]dmittedly, there must be certain outer limits, as yet undeªned, beyond 
which the executive’s treaty power is constitutionally invalid” (emphasis added). 
101 Japanese Forced Labor Litig. I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 948 (citing Regan, 453 U.S. at 679–
80)(emphasis added). 
102 Or corporations whose parent or subsidiary entities were incorporated in Japan. 
103 Regan, 453 U.S. at 686–87. 
104 See supra notes 34, 94. 
105 The petitioner in Regan was a corporation with claims arising out of contracts and 
business in Iran. See 453 U.S. at 664. 
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cannot be regarded as authoritative on the power of the federal gov-
ernment to waive the claims of U.S. citizens against the nationals of 
other countries.106 Ironically, a statement of interest ªled by the 
United States with the court indicated a better understanding of this 
distinction than was grasped by Judge Walker. In its statement of in-
terest, the United States argued that the Court’s reasoning in Regan 
strongly supports similar authority to settle claims of private citizens 
(even against private citizens of another nation) when there is a com-
pelling public policy justiªcation for doing so.107
 An immediate question which arises from this contention is 
whether there was judicial authority to support the capacity of any 
branch of government to waive the claims of its citizens against the 
private citizens of another country. One relevant precedent cited by 
the United States in its statement of interest was the 1801 case of 
United States v. Schooner Peggy108 and its dicta that “if the nation has 
given up vested rights of its citizens, it is not for the court, but for the 
government, to consider whether it be a cause for proper compensa-
tion.”109 However, the claims at issue in Schooner Peggy were of a pro-
prietary nature, and did not raise human rights concerns.110 This fac-
tor substantially devalues its applicability to Japanese Forced Labor 
Litigation (2001) and other Section 354.6 cases. In fact, the statement 
of interest could cite no judicial precedent for validating a purported 
waiver of claims of U.S. citizens against foreign nationals for violations 
of human rights.111 While the cases of Regan and Schooner Peggy sup-
                                                                                                                      
106 Cf. Japanese Forced Labor Litig. I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 948; see also Wuerth, supra note 
12, at 5 (“[T]hose cases [that] involved claims against foreign sovereigns . . . do not pro-
vide a basis for executive authority over claims against private individuals. In Dames & 
Moore v. Regan, for example, the Supreme Court upheld an executive order nullifying 
claims against Iran.”). 
107 See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States: State Responsibility for In-
jury to Aliens: Diplomatic Protection and International Claims, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 139, 142 
(2001); Statement of Interest of U.S., In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 
114 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. MDL-1347) (ªled Aug. 9, 2000), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/6641.doc (last visited Apr. 13, 2005). 
108 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801). 
109 Id. at 110. 
110 See id. at 103–06. Speciªcally, the case concerned the restoration of a trading ship 
captured by an U.S. ship to its owners, who were French citizens. See id. 
111 Aside from Regan and Schooner Peggy, four other cases were cited by the United 
States at note 7 of its Statement of Interest, supra note 107, in support of its propostition 
that Article 14(b) constitutes a valid waiver of claims: Belk v. United States, 858 F.2d 706 
(Fed. Cir. 1988); Asociasion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 735 F.2d 1517 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986); Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1951); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 199 (1796). Yet the ªrst three of these cases concern claims against sovereign na-
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port the validity of a waiver or settlement of commercial or proprie-
tary claims by the federal government, it was disingenuous of the 
United States to argue, and erroneous of the district court to accept, 
that these cases support the validity of Article 14(b), which purports 
to waive claims against private citizens or corporations for grievous 
violations of fundamental human rights. 
 However, after the decisions of Judge Walker and the decisions in 
Taiheiyo and Deutsch, the Supreme Court in Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamen-
di112 appeared to validate certain settlements of individual claims 
against corporations, even though the claims were not of a purely 
monetary or proprietary nature but implicated grave violations of 
human rights.113 Garamendi concerned the constitutional validity of 
California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 (HVIRA), 
which required every insurance company operating in California to 
disclose, upon penalty of loss of its state business license, certain in-
formation about insurance policies they or their afªliates wrote in 
Europe between 1920 and 1945.114 The state HVIRA legislation was 
enacted against the backdrop of a federal settlement of claims against 
insurance companies which had been negotiated by the President.115 
In determining the constitutionality of the HVIRA, the Court exam-
ined the Presidential power to make executive agreements which set-
tle individual claims116 and posited that such a power, which had been 
most clearly enunciated in Regan with respect to the claims of U.S. 
nationals against foreign governments, was also exercisable with re-
spect to claims against corporations.117 As the Court put it after exam-
ining Regan and other relevant authorities: “[t]he executive agree-
ments at issue here do differ in one respect from those just 
                                                                                                                      
tions (respectively, against Iran, Mexico, and the United States), rather than against private 
citizens or corporations, and the fourth case concerns private debts between British and 
U.S. nationals around the time of the Revolutionary War, rather than violations of human 
rights. Although there are a number of treaty provisions like Article 14(b), their validity 
has not been determined in court. See generally Wuerth, supra note 12 (detailing a number 
of historical waiver provisions and arguing that waivers of individual claims against private 
entities are valid if made by treaty, although not by executive agreement). 
112 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 396. 
113 See id. at 401–03. The facts in Garamendi implicated a settlement of insurance claims 
by Jewish survivors of World War II, whose policies had either been conªscated by Nazi 
Germany as part of its genocidal program or dishonored by insurance companies. See id. 
114 Id. at 408–12. 
115 Id. at 405–08. 
116 Executive agreements are created and implemented differently than treaties, but 
the issue of the validity of waivers arises regardless of whether the waivers are contained in 
executive agreements or treaties. 
117 See id. at 415–16. 
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mentioned insofar as they address claims . . . . against corporations, 
not the foreign governments. But the distinction does not matter.”118
 The Garamendi decision, however, should not be regarded as a post 
facto validation of the Ninth Circuit’s and federal district courts’ ap-
proval of Article 14(b) in the Japanese forced labor litigation cases. 
There are at least two critical factors which distinguish Article 14(b) 
from the federal settlement of claims upheld by the Court in Gara-
mendi. First, and most obviously, Garamendi concerned a substantial set-
tlement of claims, rather than a waiver of claims. The Supreme Court 
in Garamendi observed that the federal government negotiated a set-
tlement agreement under which Germany agreed to establish a foun-
dation of 10 billion deutsch marks, contributed equally by the German 
Government and German companies, to compensate the companies’ 
victims during the Nazi era.119 By contrast, Article 14(b) of the 1951 
Treaty purports to constitute a complete waiver of claims by victims of 
wartime forced labor in Japan.120 The Court in Garamendi cited its deci-
sion in Regan,121 but failed to acknowledge the distinction between the 
relatively substantial settlement of claims at issue in Garamendi and the 
nulliªcation of claims in Regan.122 The distinction is an important 
one.123 It is perhaps understandable that courts are reluctant to assess 
the adequacy of settlements for human rights abuses, particularly when 
the settlements result from arduous negotiations for the side of the vic-
tims. Nevertheless, courts must be vigilant with regard to agreements 
which purport to prevent any and all claims for compensation for such 
abuses. 
 The second distinguishing factor between the settlement of 
claims at issue in Garamendi and Article 14(b) is that the former explic-
                                                                                                                      
118 See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415–16. 
119 Id. at 405. 
120 See supra notes 5, 105 and accompanying text. 
121 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415. 
122 The Court also failed to acknowledge another key distinction between Regan and 
Garamendi. In Regan, the claims, which were nulliªed by executive action, concerned 
commercial interests rather than violations for fundamental human rights, whereas in 
Garamendi, the federal settlement concerned insurance policies which violated the jus co-
gens principle of racial non-discrimination. That the Court did not even identify this dis-
tinction between the facts in Garamendi and in Regan is a worrying sign that superior courts 
are neglecting their historical and conceptual role as protectors of rights. Part IVD, infra, 
further examines the historical role of judges as guardians of rights, insofar as it arises in 
examining and interpreting treaty provisions. 
123 In Mitsubishi Materials Corp. v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003), a California appeals court, which followed and cited the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Garamendi, also failed to recognize this distinction. See id. at 176–77. 
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itly settled claims against corporations,124 whereas Article 14(b) am-
biguously waived claims against Japan and “its nationals.”125 As dis-
cussed in Parts IV and V below, it is by no means clear that the term 
“nationals” as used in Article 14(b) encompasses corporations.126
III. Policy Considerations 
 The discussion in Part II indicates strong bases for considering Ar-
ticle 14(b) invalid under international law and scant authority for up-
holding the constitutional validity of Article 14(b) under domestic law. 
The Ninth Circuit’s and federal district courts’ exploration of Article 
14(b)’s validity therefore clearly seems wanting. It is essential, however, 
to consider why courts hearing the Japanese forced labor cases ne-
glected to properly examine the validity of Article 14(b) and indeed, 
why courts are generally reluctant to explore the validity of any treaty 
provision even where compelling grounds exist for doing so. 
 It is tempting to believe that judicial reluctance to examine the 
validity of a treaty provision in any given case stems from a principled 
weighing of policy considerations which relate to that case. In the vari-
ous Japanese forced labor litigation cases, for instance, one may wish to 
surmise, optimistically, that the courts’ reluctance to properly explore 
the validity of Article 14(b) arose from an articulation and careful 
evaluation of the manifold policy considerations at stake in those cases. 
It could be supposed that the courts eventually decided to uphold the 
government’s use of the claims of private citizens as “bargaining 
chips”127 with Japan, favoring the goals of peaceful and prosperous re-
                                                                                                                      
124 See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415. Note the Court’s statement that the 
Government agreed that whenever a German company was sued on a Holo-
caust-era claim in an American court, the Government of the United States 
would submit a statement that “it would be in the foreign policy interests of 
the United States for the Foundation to be the exclusive forum and remedy 
for the resolution of all asserted claims against German companies arising from 
their involvement in the National Socialist era and World War II” and its ref-
erence to a “letter from President Clinton to Chancellor Schröder commit-
ting to a ‘mechanism to provide the legal peace desired by the German gov-
ernment and German companies.” 
Id. (citation omitted, emphasis added). 
125 See 1951 Treaty, supra note 4, art. 14(b), 3 U.S.T. at 3183, 136 U.N.T.S. at 64. 
126 See infra notes 165–170 and accompanying text. 
127 The phrase (in its singular and plural versions) was used in both the majority and 
minority judgments in Regan. See, e.g., Regan, 453 U.S. at 673–74; see also id. at 691 (Powell, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Government must pay just compensa-
tion when it furthers the Nation’s foreign policy goals by using as ‘bargaining chips’ claims 
lawfully held by a relatively few persons and subject to the jurisdiction of our courts. The 
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lations with that country over the need to support the notion and prac-
tice of individual rights.128 This account of the courts’ reluctance to 
invalidate or even examine the legality of Article 14(b) raises concerns 
as to the strength of judicial commitment to upholding individual 
rights, but it at least supposes that judges are willing to articulate and 
undertake a balancing of policy considerations to some extent. 
 However, there is a more perturbing explanation as to why 
judges are so reluctant to invalidate treaty provisions and, indeed, to 
even examine their validity. Speciªcally, in cases which raise foreign 
policy issues, the federal government has come to enjoy an almost 
subservient judicial deference to its acts and decisions, in contrast to 
a greater judicial readiness to review domestic governmental acts and 
decisions.129 Judges are so wary of overturning, or even altering or 
interfering with, foreign policy decisions, that they often simply re-
fuse to adjudicate cases with foreign policy implications and resort 
to an array of doctrines to justify their refusal even to embark on an 
adjudicative process.130 The most notable of these doctrines is the 
political question doctrine,131 but judges also resort to the principle 
of international comity,132 the act of state doctrine,133 and the prin-
                                                                                                                      
extraordinary powers of the President and Congress upon which our decision rests cannot, 
in the circumstances of this case, displace the Just Compensation Clause of the Constitu-
tion.”) If Justice Powell was concerned about the taking of property pursuant to a waiver 
when only commercial interests were implicated, surely courts should be even more vigi-
lant about waivers when human rights are implicated. 
128 This occurred despite the fact that Article 14(b) purported to insulate corporate 
entities for egregious violations of such rights, rather than to insulate a government from 
commercial claims, as in Regan. 
129 See David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 U. 
Colo. L. Rev. 1439, 1440 (1999) (commenting that “there is very real cause for concern in 
unbridled judicial deference to executive branch decision making in the foreign relations 
area”). See generally Thomas M. Franck, Political Questions/Judicial Answers: Does 
the Rule of Law Apply to Foreign Affairs? (1992) (discussing the broad deference 
that the judiciary gives to the political branches in foreign affairs). 
130 See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 Yale L.J. 2347, 2391 
(1991); Morris A. Ratner, Factors Impacting the Selection and Positioning of Human Rights Class 
Actions in United States Courts: A Practical Overview, 58 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 623, 624, 
634–35 (2003); Jeremy Sarkin, Reparation for Past Wrongs: Using Domestic Courts Around the 
World, Especially the United States, to Pursue African Human Rights Claims, 32 Int’l J. Legal 
Info. 426, 441 n.58 (2004). 
131 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (establishing that matters of interna-
tional law can be seen as political questions). 
132 See, e.g., Hilton v Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); Bi v. Union Carbide Chem. & Plastics 
Co., 984 F. 2d 582 (2d Cir. 1993) (both referencing the principle of comity). 
133 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (applying the act 
of state doctrine to its analysis). 
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ciple of ripeness.134 Even if they do decide to adjudicate on the case 
and ostensibly disavow the application of the political question doc-
trine or comparable canons, in practice, judges habitually rule in 
favor of the government’s position on the merits, often without even 
considering the consistency of that position.135 Indeed, judges some-
times extend this extraordinary deference136 to the executive’s posi-
tion without acknowledging and examining the public policy con-
siderations which arise from it. This was evident in Garamendi, where 
the majority opinion of the Supreme Court did not mention the 
human rights factors at stake and simply declared that, while “a 
sharp line between public and private acts works for many purposes 
in the domestic law, insisting on the same line in deªning the le-
gitimate scope of the Executive’s international negotiations would 
hamstring the President in settling international controversies.”137
 It is therefore unsurprising that the U.S. government’s statement 
of interest submitted in Japanese Forced Labor Litigation (2001) recog-
nized that there needed to be “a compelling public policy justiªcation,” 
to validate a waiver of private claims, yet failed to identify the relevant 
public policy considerations at play.138 Given the practice of judicial 
deference, it appears that the government simply assumed that the dis-
trict court would not need to know which public policies were 
identiªed as relevant by the government139 and furthermore, would 
not question its judgment that there were federal, executive policies 
that justiªed the waiver in Article 14(b).140
 Judicial unwillingness to (1) review federal acts related to foreign 
policy and (2) balance competing policy considerations appears to be 
magniªed when judges are called upon to determine and apply in-
ternational law.141 It was therefore somewhat predictable that, al-
though some courts in the various Japanese forced labor cases consid-
ered the validity of Article 14(b) under domestic constitutional law, 
                                                                                                                      
134 See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter 444 U.S. 996, 997–1002 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (referring to ripeness). 
135 See Bederman, supra note 129, at 1464–68. 
136 See id. at 1465–66. 
137 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415. 
138 See Murphy, supra note 107, at 142 (citing Statement of Interest of United States of 
America, In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000) (No. MDL-1347) (ªled Aug. 9, 2000)). 
139 See id. 
140 See id. 
141 Samuel P. Baumgartner, Human Rights and Civil Litigation in United States Courts: The 
Holocaust-Era Cases, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 835, 844–46 & n.64 (2002). 
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none of them paused to consider its validity under international law 
as it is applied in the United States.142 In contrast to their forebears,143 
many judges in the United States are now reluctant to apply norms of 
international law, including international human rights law, aside 
from their applicability to limited, speciªed contexts such as the 
ATCA.144 Thus, while judges have frequently considered jus cogens 
norms in determining the ambit of the ATCA, they clearly are uncom-
fortable with invoking Article 53 or Article 64 of the VCLT to invali-
date or override treaties145 for violations of customary international 
law, even of a jus cogens status.146
                                                                                                                      
142 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
143 See Paust, supra note 11, at 306–07, for a commentary on the historical practice of 
applying international law, including human rights, in U.S. courts. For example, Paust 
refers to “the continuous use of customary international law both directly and indirectly by 
federal courts for more than 200 years. . . . In fact, Chief Justice Marshall recognized in 
1810 that our judicial tribunals ‘are established . . . to decide on human rights.’” Id. at 307. 
144 See Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Defer-
ence: A Postscript on Lawrence v. Texas, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 913, 914 (2004). Alford writes: 
Courts essentially remain convinced that the use of extra-constitutional mate-
rial, including international human rights decisions, to give meaning to the 
content and scope of constitutional guarantees is illegitimate. . . . Despite 
precedents from international human rights tribunals asserting that the death 
penalty violates international human rights, and notwithstanding citations of 
those precedents in United States death penalty litigation (in support of the 
argument that the death penalty is unconstitutional), the Supreme Court has 
never considered such arguments germane. 
Id. (footnote and internal quotations omitted); see Andrea Bianchi, International Law and 
US Courts: The Myth of Lohengrin Revisited, 15 Eur. J. Int’l L. 751, 757, 777–79; cf. Roper v. 
Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
145 Recall that the VCLT provides, somewhat overzealously and impracticably, that a 
whole treaty is void if any one of its provisions violates a jus cogens norm that existed at the 
time the treaty was concluded, supra note 73, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344, or a jus cogens 
norm that emerged after the treaty came into force, id. art. 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347. As-
suming that the norm prohibiting forced labor evolved into a jus cogens norm after the 
1951 Treaty came into effect, under international law, a court would be bound to take the 
extraordinary position that the entire 1951 Treaty is void, rather than just the offending 
provision (Article 14(b)). In order for Article 14(b) to be severable from the rest of the 
1951 Treaty, it would have to satisfy stringent criteria pursuant to Article 44 of the VCLT, 
id. art. 44, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 343 (e.g., the offending clause must not have been an essential 
basis of the consent of the other party or parties to be bound by the treaty), but these 
would be unlikely to be satisªed. Hence, the VCLT hardly encourages due judicial consid-
eration of treaty provisions that violate jus cogens norms and this may be an additional rea-
son why judges in the Japanese forced labor litigation were reluctant to examine the valid-
ity of Article 14(b) under international law. 
146 Also, the Court in Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700, stated that customary interna-
tional law was meant to apply in the absence of a treaty or “controlling executive or legisla-
tive act or judicial decision.” But see Henkin, supra note 64, at 1564 (noting that “[t]he 
status of customary international law and the law of the United States in relation to treaties 
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 How then should a court address challenges to a waiver clause like 
Article 14(b)? In the interest of transparency, courts at least must be 
willing to recognize and articulate the competing public policy con-
siderations at stake. On the one hand, it can be argued that (1) the 
terms of the 1951 Treaty, including Article 14(b), were vital in creat-
ing a lasting peace with Japan, (2) the executive branch of the federal 
government was best placed to frame the terms of this peace, and (3) 
Japan’s displeasure with the Californian suits threatens the harmony 
of U.S.–Japanese relations, which is essential for economic and secu-
rity reasons.147 Such policy arguments buttress judicial reluctance to 
invalidate Article 14(b). On the other hand, the plaintiffs in the Cali-
fornian suits suffered such atrocious violations of human rights148 that 
to deny them redress is innately unjust and tantamount to condoning 
the actions of the perpetrators. Furthermore, human rights norms 
have undergone an exponential development and inºuence in the 
decades since World War II, to the extent that concerns about human 
rights have expanded beyond the conªnes of international organiza-
tions, nations’ foreign affairs, and state departments to permeate the 
consciences of local polities and communities.149
 If judges are to disallow or discourage local initiatives to protect 
human rights,150 they also must not abdicate their established role as 
guardians of individual rights.151 This judicial role is critical when con-
sidering the natural tendency of federal governments to be pre-
occupied with national trade and security issues, to the comparative 
neglect of the seemingly “microcosmic” concerns of individual rights. 
One obvious undesirable consequence of judicial obeisance to federal 
                                                                                                                      
or acts of Congress has not been authoritatively determined”). It should also be noted that 
Article 2(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) provides 
the right to an “effective remedy” for forced labor (which is prohibited in Article 8 of the 
ICCPR). See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 2(3), 
8, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174, 175. The United States has declared the substantive provisions of 
the ICCPR to be not self-executing, but the covenant arguably has the force of customary 
international law. See id. 
147 See Japanese Forced Labor Litig. III, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1173, 1175; Japanese Forced Labor 
Litig. I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 943, 947 (discussing these arguments). 
148 See supra notes 19–26 and accompanying text. 
149 Aside from Section 354.6, other examples of such state and local laws include the 
Massachusetts Burma law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 7, §§ 22G–M (2004), and the HVIRA, Cal. 
Ins. Code §§ 13800–13807 (1999). 
150 See generally Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (ªnding the HVIRA unconstitutional); 
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (ªnding the Massachusetts 
Burma Law unconstitutional, albeit on narrow grounds); Deutsch II, 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 
2003) (ªnding Section 354.6 unconstitutional). 
151 Paust, supra note 11, at 320–21. 
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foreign policy agreements, especially when individual rights are impli-
cated, is the stark inequalities in the application of such rights. For ex-
ample, former forced laborers who worked for European companies 
under Nazi rule endured similar judicial reluctance to enforce their 
claims for compensation, because of waiver clauses in post-war peace 
treaties, but now are receiving compensation as a result of intensive ef-
forts by the federal government.152 By contrast, former forced laborers 
who worked for Japanese corporations have not beneªted from any 
such federal foreign policy efforts.153 If judges readily assumed their 
role as protectors of individual rights, they could avoid, or at least 
lessen, such a disparity in the rights of former forced laborers caused by 
the inconstant and politicized inclinations of the federal government. 
 Regrettably, there may be instances where a waiver of human 
rights claims may be indispensable in bringing about the conclusion 
of a war or other international crisis. In these circumstances, a gov-
ernment may need to agree to a waiver clause, even though the result-
ing impunity will undoubtedly be painful to bear for those persons 
who have suffered at the hands of that state and its nationals, as well 
as being inequitable from the perspective of any person and organiza-
tion seeking to uphold basic human rights in our world. Courts may 
be compelled on policy grounds to uphold such a waiver.154 However, 
even in those cases, judges should articulate the varied policy consid-
erations at stake and, in particular, remain mindful of upholding their 
responsibility to protect individual human rights to the extent possi-
ble. Judges should protect rights in a manner reconcilable with the 
text of the waiver clause, while adopting an approach consistent with 
judicial precedent. An important means by which courts can balance, 
to some degree, the competing interests of federalized foreign rela-
tions with the need to protect basic human rights is through interpreta-
tion, a tool which enables judges to avoid the seemingly drastic action 
of invalidating a treaty or any of its provisions. The following section 
highlights the need to determine the scope of Article 14(b) and out-
lines three interpretive methods which were open to judges in the 
forced labor litigation cases. U.S. judges have previously used the lat-
                                                                                                                      
152 Bayzler, supra note 35, at 29–31. 
153 For a commentary on the disparity between federal government efforts with respect 
to Europe and Japan, see id. at 28 n.79. 
154 Indeed, the making and maintaining of a lasting peace is generally a necessary pre-
cursor to the entrenchment of human rights and other “goods” in any community. 
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ter two of these methods in cases where individual rights have 
conºicted with federal acts in the sphere of foreign relations.155
IV. Interpretation as a Tool for Protecting Rights and 
Balancing Policy Considerations: Interpretive  
Approaches in International and Domestic Law 
A. Ambiguities in Article 14(b) 
 Having assumed or swiftly determined that Article 14(b) is a legally 
valid treaty provision, the courts hearing the Japanese forced labor 
claims proceeded to pay perfunctory consideration to the meaning or 
scope of Article 14(b).156 This was despite the claimants’ arguments 
that there were several ambiguities in the language of Article 14(b) that 
precluded their claims from the scope of the waiver.157
 For example, claimants pointed to the phrase in Article 14(b), 
“claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any ac-
tions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution 
of the war,” and questioned whether the defendants, being corpora-
tions rather than government entities or members of the armed 
forces, could have acted in prosecuting the war.158
 The claimants further argued that the aforementioned phrase in 
Article 14(b) of the 1951 Treaty could not have been intended to pre-
clude claims of Allied POWs and civilian internees, given that the re-
ciprocal waiver clause in Article 19, which barred claims of Japanese 
nationals against Allied Powers and their nationals, speciªcally waived 
the claims and debts arising in respect to “Japanese prisoners of war 
                                                                                                                      
155 See, e.g., United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446 (1924); United States v. Rauscher, 119 
U.S. 407 (1886); see also infra, Part IVC–D. 
156 For example, in response to the plaintiff’s arguments of vagueness and ambiguity 
in the text of Article 14(b), Judge Walker commented that “[t]he court does not ªnd the 
treaty language ambiguous, and therefore its analysis need go no further.” Japanese Forced 
Labor Litig. I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 945. In Deutsch I, the court noted the plaintiff’s arguments 
as to the meaning of Article 14(b). Deutsch I, 317 F.3d at 1025–26. But, given its ªnding 
that Section 354.6 was an unconstitutional intrusion into foreign affairs, the court did not 
proceed to address such arguments. See id. The Mitsubishi Materials decision constitutes a 
notable exception to the otherwise perfunctory analysis of the meaning of Article 14(b) by 
courts in the Japanese forced labor cases. See Mitsubishi Materials, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 164 
(noting the plaintiff’s argument as to the meaning and scope of Article 14(b)); see also id. 
at 170–75 (addressing some of these arguments). 
157 For a summary recitation of these arguments, see Japanese Forced Labor Litigation I, 
114 F. Supp. 2d at 948, and Mitsubishi Materials,6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 164. 
158 Japanese Forced Labor Litig. I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 948; see Deutsch I, 317 F.3d at 1025 
n.12. 
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and civilian internees in the hands of the Allied Powers.”159 The 
claimants argued that, had the parties to the 1951 Treaty intended to 
preclude the claims of Allied POWs and civilian internees, Article 
14(b) would have mirrored the wording of Article 19 and contained 
speciªc reference to these categories of persons.160
 The claimants also cited the limiting nature of the introductory 
clause of Article 14(b): “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the present 
Treaty . . . .”161 The claimants noted that Article 26 of the 1951 Treaty 
provides that if Japan makes a war claims settlement with any country 
granting it greater advantages than those provided by the 1951 Treaty, 
then Japan must grant those same advantages to the parties to the 1951 
Treaty.162 They then pointed out that, since the conclusion of the 1951 
Treaty, the Japanese government had entered into war claims settle-
ment agreements with other countries (including the Netherlands, the 
Philippines, Vietnam, Russia, and Burma) permitting nationals of those 
countries to sue Japanese nationals, or to receive reparations or pay-
ments from Japan or Japanese companies in compensation for their 
forced labor, on terms far more favorable than U.S. veterans.163
 Perhaps the most ambiguous aspect of Article 14(b) is the use of 
the phrase “Japan and its nationals,” raising the speciªc question of 
whether the term “nationals” can be deemed to include the defendant 
                                                                                                                      
159 1951 Treaty, supra note 4, art. 19(b), 3 U.S.T. at 3187, 136 U.N.T.S. at 70. The arti-
cle provides that: 
(a) Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the Allied Powers 
and their nationals arising out of the war or out of actions taken because of 
the existence of a state of war, and waives all claims arising from the presence, 
operations or actions of forces or authorities of any of the Allied Powers in 
Japanese territory prior to the coming into force of the present Treaty. 
(b) The foregoing waiver includes any claims arising out of actions taken by any 
of the Allied Powers with respect to Japanese ships between 1 September 1939 
and the coming into force of the present Treaty, as well as any claims and debts 
arising in respect to Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of the 
Allied Powers, but does not include Japanese claims speciªcally recognized in 
the laws of any Allied Power enacted since 2 September 1945. 
Id. art. 19(a)–(b), 3 U.S.T. at 3187, 136 U.N.T.S. at 70 (emphasis added). 
160 Japanese Forced Labor Litig. I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 945. 
161 1951 Treaty, supra note 4, art. 14(b), 3 U.S.T. at 3183, 136 U.N.T.S. at 64. 
162 Id. art. 26, 3 U.S.T. at 3190–91, 136 U.N.T.S. at 76 (“Should Japan make a peace set-
tlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than 
those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the par-
ties to the present Treaty.”). 
163 See Bayzler, supra note 35, at 29–30; Rosen v. People of Japan, Complaint, para. 40, 
available at http://anthonydamato.law.northwestern.edu/Adobeªles/Rosen-Japan-Comp 
laint-ªled.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2005). 
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corporations (i.e. juridicial persons) as well as individuals (i.e. natural 
persons), particularly given that the defendants were multinational 
corporations.164 There is considerable evidence that the parties did not 
intend or assume the term “nationals” to encompass corporations. 
Speciªcally, the practice of other nations with respect to treaties in the 
immediate post-war era was to assume that the term “nationals” did not 
include corporations. If the term “nationals” was deªned, this was usu-
ally done so as to limit or expand the categories of private individuals 
who should be deemed nationals for the purposes of that treaty.165 
Where the parties to a treaty that was concluded in the immediate post-
war era intended that corporations be treated in the same way as pri-
vate citizens, they separately referred to “nationals” and “companies” 
(or to “nationals” and “corporations”).166 It was only during and after 
the 1960s that states more frequently adopted express deªnitions of the 
term “nationals” that encompassed corporate entities, and such 
deªnitions speciªed the circumstances under which a corporation 
would be deemed a “national” under the treaty.167 But even this change 
                                                                                                                      
164 Mitsubishi Materials, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 164 n.3. 
165 See Treaty of Peace, Apr. 28, 1952, P.R.C.-Japan, 136 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter China-
Japan Treaty] (including corporations in the deªnition of “juridicial persons” but not “na-
tionals”). Article 10 of that treaty states: 
For the purposes of the present Treaty, nationals of the Republic of China 
shall be deemed to include all the inhabitants and former inhabitants of Taiwan 
(Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and their descendents who are of 
the Chinese nationality in accordance with the laws and regulations which 
have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan 
(Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores). 
Id. art. 10 (emphasis added). 
166 See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, 
art. VII(1) 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2069. Article VIII(1) refers in pertinent part to “[n]ationals and 
companies of either Party” (emphasis added), clearly indicating that corporate entities 
were not assumed to be “nationals.” Id. art. VIII(1), 4 U.S.T. at 2070. Likewise, the Treaty 
of Commerce, Establishment and Navigation of 1959 between the United Kingdom and 
Iran separately deªned “nationals” and “companies.” See Brownlie, supra note 68, at 426–
27; see also Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, U.S.-Italy, arts. I–
III, 63 Stat. 2255, 2256–60 (referring separately to “nationals,” “corporations,” and “asso-
ciations,” although similar rights are granted under the Treaty to persons or entities falling 
under these three categories). 
167 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, art. 25, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 1280, 575 
U.N.T.S. 159, 175–76 [hereinafter ICSID Convention] (deªning the term “national of 
another Contracting State” to mean any natural or juridical person). A corporation 
qualiªes as a juridical person and would appear to be considered a national of the state in 
which it is incorporated or where its headquarters are situated. See id. The Treaty Establish-
ing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 294 U.N.T.S. 5 [hereinafter Treaty 
of Rome], can be regarded as a half-way house between post-war treaties and treaties that 
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of practice usually has been employed with respect to tax-related and 
other commercially oriented treaties.168 In the absence of an express 
deªnition of the term “nationals” to include corporations, the prevail-
ing practices of the United States, other countries, and international 
organizations in drafting international documents, especially of a non-
commercial nature, still appear to regard “nationals” and “corpora-
tions” as distinct categories.169 For instance, a relatively recent United 
Nations Security Council resolution provided that: “Iraq . . . is liable 
under international law for any direct loss, damage, including envi-
ronmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to 
foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of its un-
lawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait . . . .”170 The drafters of the 
1951 Treaty surely must have been aware of the conventional percep-
tion that “nationals” and “companies” were distinct types of persons. If 
their intention was for companies or corporations to be considered 
“nationals,” this would have warranted an express provision or 
clariªcation to that effect. In the absence of such express language, 
there are strong grounds to consider that Article 14(b) should not be 
deemed to waive claims against corporations. 
 Yet, with respect to all these aspects which are open to interpreta-
tion, the near consistent stance of the courts in the Japanese forced la-
bor litigation was simply to deny ambiguities and insist that Article 
                                                                                                                      
came into effect in the 1960s or later. Article 58 provides that “Companies or ªrms formed 
in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their registered ofªce, central 
administration or principal place of business within the Community shall, for the purposes 
of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of Mem-
ber States.” Id. art. 58, 294 U.N.T.S. at 57; see Brownlie, supra note 68, at 427. 
168 ICSID Convention, supra note 167, art. 25, 17 U.S.T. at 1280, 575 U.N.T.S. at 175–
76; Treaty of Rome, supra note 167, art. 58, 294 U.N.T.S. at 57. 
169 In fact, it remains a common practice of the United States to categorize “nationals” 
and “companies” separately even in commercially-oriented treaties. Thus, for example, the 
Treaty Concerning Business and Economic Relations, 1990, U.S.-Poland (Congressional 
Treaty Number: 101–18) contains numerous instances of the phrase “nationals and com-
panies” (emphasis added), such as in Articles III, VI, and IX. The Treaty Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, 1986, U.S.-Egypt, (Congres-
sional Treaty Number: 99–24) also contains several instances of the same phrase, such as in 
Articles II and X. The Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection 
of Investment, 1994, United States-Uzbekistan (Congressional Treaty Number: 104–25) 
uses the term “nationals or companies” in Article II and the term “national or company” in 
Article IX, again indicating that the United States continues to regard “nationals” as natu-
ral persons. Indeed, Article I of each of the three aforementioned treaties goes so far as to 
deªne “nationals” as natural persons and “companies” as legally constituted entities. 
170 S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg. ¶19, U.N. Doc. S/22454 (1991) 
(emphasis added). 
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14(b) was “clearly” broad enough to preclude the plaintiffs’ claims.171 
Responding to the plaintiffs’ arguments relating to the scope of Article 
14(b), Judge Walker in Japanese Forced Labor Litigation (2000), for exam-
ple, curtly stated that “[t]he court does not ªnd the treaty language 
ambiguous, and therefore its analysis need go no further.”172 Judge 
Walker, and the other judges who heard the plaintiffs’ arguments in the 
Japanese forced labor litigation, may have beneªted from the adoption 
of (or at least awareness of) more systematic interpretive approaches, 
three of which are outlined below. These approaches are not abstract 
rights-based theories that are often unappealing to judges, but rather 
practical methods for resolving disputes in which rights are potentially 
contravened by a treaty provision. In applying such approaches, it still is 
possible that the judges nevertheless would have concluded that Article 
14(b) should be interpreted to bar the plaintiffs’ claims in the forced 
labor litigation, but at the very least, they would have done so after un-
dertaking a procedural analysis beªtting their judicial status as guardi-
ans of individual rights. 
B. Interpretation of Treaties under the VCLT 
 As noted above, the VCLT, although not ratiªed by the United 
States, is accepted as declaratory of customary international law and 
therefore accepted as binding in U.S. law.173 Article 31 of the VCLT 
sets forth the general rule of interpretation of treaties: 
 A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and pur-
pose. . . . There shall be taken into account, together with the 
context . . . any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regard-
ing its interpretation . . . [and] any relevant rules of interna-
tional law applicable in the relations between the parties.174
                                                                                                                      
171 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
172 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
173 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
174 VCLT, supra note 73, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340 The entire text reads as follows: 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall com-
prise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
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 Article 32 of the VCLT provides that recourse may be had to sup-
plementary means of interpretation.175 This includes the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
conªrm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or 
alternatively, to determine the meaning when the interpretation ac-
cording to Article 31 either leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, 
or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.176
 Application of the interpretive principles set forth in the VCLT 
would not appear to immediately resolve the meaning of ambiguous 
phrases in Article 14(b). Article 31 of the VCLT requires that both 
“subsequent practice” and “relevant rules of international law” be taken 
into account.177 These two criteria, however, could produce contradic-
tory results. For instance, it is the subsequent practice of the U.S. gov-
ernment that Article 14(b) be interpreted to bar compensation claims 
by former POWs and other forced laborers against Japan, and multina-
tional corporations identiªed as Japanese, such as Nippon Steel Corpo-
ration, Mitsubishi International Corporation, and Mitsui & Co. Ltd.178 
                                                                                                                      
 (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the 
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
 (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an in-
strument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
 (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpre-
tation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
 (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which estab-
lishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
 (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations be-
tween the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the par-
ties so intended. 
Id. 
175 Id. art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340. 
176 Id., 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340. The entire article reads as follows: 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including 
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in 
order to conªrm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or 
to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
 (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
 (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
Id. 
177 See id. art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340. 
178 Bayzler, supra note 35, at 29. The Japanese government appears to have shared the 
same interpretation, given that its view that allowing the Section 354.6 claims could im-
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Yet relevant rules of international law argue against an interpretation 
that bars the forced laborers’ claims in the Japanese forced labor litiga-
tion cases. For example, Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights,179 which is widely accepted as declaratory of customary 
international law,180 provides that everyone must have “the right to an 
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating 
the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.”181 
Article 4 of ILO Convention No. 29,182 ratiªed by both the United 
States and Japan, states that each “competent authority shall not im-
pose or permit the imposition of forced or compulsory labor for the 
beneªt of private individuals, companies or associations.”183
 How should this apparent conºict between the “subsequent prac-
tice in the application of the treaty” and the “relevant rules of interna-
tional law” be resolved? It should be recalled that a treaty provision 
which bars compensation for forced labor is likely to conºict with a 
jus cogens rule of international law, especially when that forced labor 
was carried out in a manner akin to slavery and was not sufªciently 
                                                                                                                      
pede diplomatic relations with the United States. See Japanese Forced Labor Litig. III, 164 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1173, 1175. 
179 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d 
plenary mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. Article 8 provides that 
“[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for 
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.” Id. art. 8, 
at 73 (emphasis added). 
180 See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals 
Rather Than States, 32 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 15–16 (1982). 
181 Nicholas P. Van Deven, Taking One for The Team: Principle of Treaty Adherence as a So-
cial Imperative for Preserving Globalization and International Legal Legitimacy as Upheld in In Re 
World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 46 St. Louis U. L.J. 1091, 1108 
(2002). 
182 See Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, supra note 80, art. 4, 39 
U.N.T.S. at 58–59. 
183 Similarly, application of the interpretive criteria expressed in Article 32 of the 
VCLT yields contradictory results. See VCLT, supra note 73, art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340. 
The travaux préparatoires of the 1951 Treaty does not indicate whether the parties intended 
to bar compensation claims for forced labor by Allied POWs and civilians against Japanese 
corporations. The “circumstances of [the treaty’s] conclusion,” however, suggest that the 
parties did not intend to bar compensation claims by forced laborers against Japanese 
corporations. For example, as argued in Part IV, infra, in the era that the 1951 Treaty was 
concluded, the prevailing practice was to interpret the term “nationals” to exclude corpora-
tions, unless corporations or other juridical persons were speciªcally included within a 
deªnition of “nationals.” Additional relevant “circumstances of [the treaty’s] conclusion” 
include the fact that Article 19 of the 1951 Treaty speciªcally prohibited “claims and debts 
arising in respect to Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of the 
Allied Powers,” supra note 4, art. 19, 3 U.S.T. at 3187, 136 U.N.T.S. at 70, whereas no such 
express prohibition on “claims in respect to Allied POWs and civilian internees in the 
hands of the Japanese” appeared anywhere in the 1951 Treaty. 
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and comprehensively redressed by other compensatory measures, as 
appears to be the case with forced labor in wartime Japan.184 An in-
terpretation of Article 14(b) which causes it to conºict with a jus co-
gens norm would render the 1951 Treaty or at least Article 14(b) void 
under international law, pursuant to the provisions of Article 53 or 
Article 64 of the VCLT.185 Although Article 31 of the VCLT requires 
judges interpreting treaties to take into account both “subsequent 
practice” when interpreting the treaty as well as “relevant rules of in-
ternational law,”186 a logical consequence of the supreme status of jus 
cogens rules in international law is that, where an interpretation ac-
cording to “subsequent practice” conºicts with an interpretation ac-
cording to a relevant jus cogens rule of international law, the latter 
should be preferred. 
 As noted above, however, the United States has not ratiªed the 
VCLT.187 And it has been observed that the principles of interpreta-
tion set forth in the VCLT are not identical to domestic principles of 
treaty interpretation developed in U.S courts.188 There are two such 
domestic principles of interpretation, which judges have previously 
applied when interpreting treaty provisions, that are relevant to de-
termining the meaning and scope of Article 14(b). Neither of these 
principles were applied by the judges in the Japanese forced labor 
litigation cases. The ªrst is the principle that federal acts, including 
treaties, should be interpreted in a manner consistent with customary 
international law and especially, with human rights norms embedded 
therein.189 The second is the principle that, irrespective of interna-
tional law per se, courts should interpret treaties in a manner protec-
tive of individual rights, whether those rights derive from the Constitu-
tion, the common law, or international law.190 The following two 
sections will summarize the development of these approaches in U.S. 
jurisprudence and demonstrate their applicability to resolving the 
ambiguities in the text of Article 14(b). 
                                                                                                                      
184 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
185 See supra notes 74–75, 89 and accompanying text. 
186 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
187 See supra note 73. 
188 Acrilicos v. Regan, 617 F. Supp. 1082, 1086 n.15 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1985). 
189 See infra Part IVB. 
190 See infra Part IVC. 
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C. Interpretive Impact of Customary International Law in U.S. Law 
 Despite the pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court in The 
Paquete Habana and Charming Betsy,191 and of eminent commentators 
like Professors Paust192 and Henkin,193 concerning the automatic ef-
fect of international law in U.S. courts, it remains unlikely that a treaty 
or statute would be invalidated by a U.S. court for failure to comply 
with customary international law.194 The more widely accepted impact 
of customary international law on U.S. domestic law is that customary 
international law modulates the interpretation of congressional and ex-
ecutive acts.195 In particular, there is strong authority for the view that 
legislative and executive acts must be interpreted to be consistent with 
customary international law, especially, but not exclusively, with the 
human rights norms embedded therein.196
 The genesis of this canon of interpretation is the Supreme Court’s 
holding almost two hundred years ago in Charming Betsy that “an act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if 
any other possible construction remains.”197 The canon, which subse-
quently was applied to the interpretation of treaties,198 is clearly of rele-
vance to the Japanese war reparations cases given that several terms and 
phrases in Article 14(b) are open to various plausible interpretations 
(such as whether “nationals” of Japan include corporations, especially 
multinational corporations (MNCs),199 and whether the phrase “in the 
                                                                                                                      
191 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
192 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
193 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
194 See Van Deven, supra note 181, at 1113, who observes that an inquiry into whether 
the 1951 Treaty is invalid for conºicting with customary international law may be a “nov-
elty” for U.S. courts (citing Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 115 cmt. 
d (1987), which states that “[i]t has also not been authoritatively determined whether a 
rule of customary international law that developed after, and is inconsistent with, an ear-
lier statute or international agreement of the United States should be given effect as the 
law of the United States”); see also Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (stating 
that it has long been settled that “the federal courts are bound to recognize [treaties, stat-
utes, or constitutional provisions] as superior to canons of international law,” and adding 
that “[t]here is no power in this Court to declare null and void a statute adopted by Con-
gress or a declaration included in a treaty merely on the ground that such provision vio-
lates a principle of international law”). 
195 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 66, at 483. 
196 See Paust, supra note 11, at 306–07. 
197 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 (2 Cranch) U.S. 64, 118 (1804). 
198 See, e.g., Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931). 
199 A multinational corporation (MNC) can be deªned as a “cluster of corporations of 
diverse nationality joined together by ties of common ownership and responsive to a 
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course of the prosecution of the war” encompasses actions by private 
companies).200 Given that forced labor violates a customary interna-
tional norm (indeed, most often a jus cogens norm) and that customary 
international law provides that states should ensure remedies for viola-
tions of fundamental rights,201 this historical canon of interpretation 
would oblige courts to interpret ambiguous language of Article 14(b) 
in a manner favorable to victims of forced labor seeking compensatory 
remedies. 
 The Charming Betsy canon was implicitly applied in United States v. 
Rauscher ,202 where the Court interpreted the Webster-Ashburton Treaty 
of 1842203 in light of customary international law. After surveying vari-
ous commentary on the issue of whether a person extradited for a 
speciªc offense pursuant to an extradition treaty could be tried for any 
other offense, the Court in Rauscher implied a term in the Webster-
Ashburton Treaty that an extradited person could not be tried for any 
offense other than the speciªc crime for which he was extradited.204 
The Court reiterated the general principle that treaties must be con-
strued in light of customary international law in later decisions, such as 
in Santovincenzo v. Egan, where it stated that “[as] treaties are contracts 
between independent nations, their words are to be taken in their or-
dinary meaning ‘as understood in the public law of nations.’”205
 However, the decision in Rauscher was qualiªed by the Supreme 
Court’s controversial decision more than a century later in United 
States v. Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez-Machain I ), which concerned the ab-
duction of a Mexican citizen, who was brought from Mexico to the 
United States and indicted on criminal charges.206 The Court was 
called on by the Mexican national to imply a term in the 1978 Extra-
dition Treaty207 between the United States and Mexico prohibiting 
                                                                                                                      
common management strategy.” Raymond Vernon, Economic Sovereignty at Bay, 47 Foreign 
Aff. 110, 114 (1968–1969). 
200 See Deutsch I, 317 F.3d at 1025 n.12; Japanese Forced Labor Litig. I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 
948; Mitsubishi Materials, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 164. 
201 See UDHR, supra note 179, art. 8, at 73. 
202 United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886). 
203 A Treaty to Settle and Deªne the Boundaries Between the Territories of the United 
States and the Possessions of Her Britannic Majesty in North America; for the Final Sup-
pression of the African Slave Trade; and for the Giving up of Criminals, Fugitive from Jus-
tice, in Certain Cases, U.S.-G.B., Aug. 9, 1842, 8 Stat. 576. 
204 See Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 416–17. 
205 Santovincenzo, 284 U.S. at 40 (citing Riggs, 133 U.S. at 271). 
206 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (“Alvarez-Machain I”). The 
decision was heavily criticized by commentators. See, e.g., Rehm, supra note 63. 
207 May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059. 
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abductions, in light of customary international law as evidenced, for 
example, by the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization 
of American States.208 This time, the Court refused to interpret the 
treaty in accordance with customary international law, stating that 
“only the most general of international law principles” supported an 
implied term prohibiting abductions.209 The Court did not overrule 
Rauscher, but stated that in that case, the Court had implied a term 
which was supported by the actual practice of nations with regard to 
extradition treaties, a factor that the Court deemed absent on the 
facts in Alvarez-Machain I.210
 Given the decision in Alvarez-Machain I, the Californian courts in 
the Japanese forced labor cases could arguably be forgiven for over-
looking the interpretive impact of customary international law on 
treaties. There does not appear to be a speciªc and observed interna-
tional custom which prohibits a government from waiving reparations 
claims of its nationals in peace treaties for human rights abuses suf-
fered by such nationals.211
 Even in the face of Alvarez-Machain I, there is a compelling reason 
why the courts in the Japanese war reparations cases should neverthe-
less have interpreted Article 14(b) in a manner that allowed compen-
sation claims by forced laborers. Namely, the customary international 
norm implicated in the Japanese war reparations cases is a fundamen-
tal, or jus cogens, norm.212 In comparison, the norm at issue in Alvarez-
Machain I--the prohibition against abductions--is not of a comparably 
high status.213 While customary international norms are usually con-
tingent on both state practice (speciªcally, widespread and consistent 
                                                                                                                      
208 Alvarez-Machain I, 504 U.S. at 666. 
209 Id. at 669. 
210 Id. at 667–68. Hence, in the language of Roman law, the Court in Alvarez-Machain I 
appeared to hold that only lex lata (the law as actually practiced) could be used to inform 
the meaning of a treaty provision, and not lex ferenda (the law as it should be). See id. For an 
analysis of (descriptive) lex lata and (normative) lex ferenda, and how these two concepts 
intersect in the “modern” approach to customary international law, see Roberts, supra note 
70, at 763. 
211 There is a general, and frequently violated, customary norm that states should en-
sure judicial remedies for violations of fundamental rights. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 179, 
art. 8, at 73. This would appear to be an insufªciently speciªc norm under the speciªcity 
test set forth in Alvarez-Machain I, as it is not a norm relating to a speciªc type of treaty 
(e.g. extradition treaties or peace treaties). Cf. Alvarez-Machain I, 504 U.S. at 658 (inter-
preting a particular treaty). 
212 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
213 The norm prohibiting abductions is not included on lists of established jus cogens 
norms. See, e.g., Brownlie, supra note 68, at 515 (lacking mention of prohibition of abduc-
tions in its list of established jus cogens norms). 
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state practice of the norm) and opinio juris (the belief of states that the 
practice is legally obligated), jus cogens norms constitute a special, 
“superior” category of customary international law.214 Jus cogens norms 
depend heavily on evidence of opinio juris and will not be undermined 
by contrary state practice.215 This view was recently reºected in the 
dicta of the Ninth Ciruit in Alvarez-Machain v. United States et al.216 (Al-
varez-Machain II), which reiterated that: 
Customary international law, like international law deªned 
by treaties and other international agreements, rests on the 
consent of states. A state that persistently objects to a norm 
of customary international law that other states accept is not 
bound by that norm. . . . In contrast, jus cogens embraces cus-
tomary laws considered binding on all nations and is derived 
from values taken to be fundamental by the international 
community, rather than from the fortuitous or self-interested 
                                                                                                                      
214 See id. (referring to jus cogens norms as “overriding principles” and as “rules of cus-
tomary law which cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence”). 
215 See Roberts, supra note 70, at 790; Oscar Schacter, Entangled Treaty and Custom, in 
International Law at a Time of Perplexity 717, 733–35 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989). In 
theory, a jus cogens norm can be modiªed by a subsequent norm of the same character. See 
VCLT, supra note 73, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344. Given the fundamental normative status 
of a jus cogens norm, however, such modiªcation would be most unlikely to occur. See De-
gan, supra note 71, at 228. 
216 Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“Alvarez-
Machain II”). Following Alvarez-Machain I, the criminal case against Alvarez-Machain was 
heard on remand, but, in an ironic twist, was thrown out for lack of evidence. See United 
States v. Alvarez-Machain, No. CR-87–422-(G)-ER (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1992). Following this 
dismissal, Alvarez-Machain sued the United States for, inter alia, violation of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and the ATCA. 331 F.3d at 608. After a series of decisions consid-
ered whether Alvarez-Machain could proceed with such a suit, in 2002 the Ninth Circuit 
granted a rehearing en banc and issued its decision in 2003 in Alvarez-Machain II, where it 
held (1) that transborder abduction does not violate customary international human 
rights law, as required to be actionable under ATCA because prohibition of such acts is not 
an international norm which is speciªc, universal, and obligatory, id. at 617–20, but (2) 
that the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention is such a norm which is actionable 
under the ATCA, and Alvarez-Machain, therefore, has a remedy for his unilateral, noncon-
sensual, extraterritorial arrest and detention, id. at 620, and (3) the limited waiver of sov-
ereign immunity of the United States operates in this case as neither the “foreign activi-
ties” exception or the “intentional tort” exception, id. at 637–40. The Supreme Court very 
recently reversed the Ninth Circuit’s holdings, determining inter alia that the prohibition 
of arbitrary arrest and detention is not a binding customary norm and is not actionable 
under the ATCA. See Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). However, nothing in 
the Court’s decision repudiated the Ninth Circuit’s dicta regarding the identiªcation of jus 
cogens norms. Indeed, a majority of the Court recognized that grave violations of funda-
mental human rights norms, such as torture and slavery, are actionable under the ATCA. 
See id. at 2765–66. 
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choices of nations. Whereas customary international law de-
rives solely from the consent of states, the fundamental and 
universal norms constituting jus cogens transcend such con-
sent . . . .217
 Alvarez-Machain I concerned a human rights norm, but not one 
which approached the status of jus cogens. By contrast, the imperative 
nature of a jus cogens norm is not affected by contrary state practice 
and, once established by evidence of a strong opinio juris, a jus cogens 
norm can continue to inform the interpretation of statutes regardless 
of non-compliance by nations.218 It is submitted that these decisions 
nuance the principle laid down in Alvarez-Machain I, which established 
that a treaty should be interpreted in light of customary international 
law only when there exists a speciªc norm in customary international 
law that is supported by the actual practice of nations with respect to 
the same type of treaty being examined.219 In particular, where the rele-
vant norm is a jus cogens norm, the treaty should be interpreted to avoid 
inconsistency with that norm, even if it is disregarded in practice, since 
jus cogens norms are predicated on opinio juris rather than state prac-
tice.220 Moreover, the speciªcity of the norm and the type of treaty at 
issue should not be matters for examination, given that jus cogens norms 
are, by deªnition, established norms of universal applicability.221
 In short, a two-stage interpretive test to resolve an apparent 
conºict between a treaty and customary international law appears to 
emerge from a combined reading of the Charming Betsy, Rauscher, Al-
varez-Machain I, and Alvarez-Machain II cases. Normally, a treaty need 
only be interpreted so as to avoid inconsistency with speciªc and ob-
served rules of customary international law in relation to the type of 
treaty being examined.222 However, where a jus cogens norm is at stake, 
the treaty should be interpreted so as to avoid inconsistency with such 
a norm regardless of whether it is supported by the actual practice of 
nations with respect to the same type of treaty being examined.223 
                                                                                                                      
217 Alvarez Machain II, 331 F.3d at 613 (quoting Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Ar-
gentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir.1992)). 
218 For example, the ATCA was interpreted in light of the jus cogens norm prohibiting 
torture in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 & n.15 (2d Cir. 1980). If jus cogens norms 
affect the interpretation of statutes regardless of non-compliance by nations, then pre-
sumably such norms would comparably affect the interpretation of treaties. 
219 See Alvarez-Machain I, 504 U.S. at 666–68. 
220 See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
221 See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text. 
222 See Alvarez-Machain I, 504 U.S. at 657; Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 433. 
223 See Alvarez-Machain II, 331 F.3d at 609. 
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Applying this test to the interpretation of Article 14(b) of the 1951 
Treaty in the Japanese forced labor cases, which appeared to violate 
the jus cogens norm prohibiting forced labor, the courts were bound to 
interpret Article 14(b) in a manner which did not preclude claims for 
compensation by victims of forced labor. One of the particular ways in 
which the courts could have so interpreted Article 14(b) is discussed 
in Part V below. 
D. Rights-Based Interpretation of Treaties in Judicial Precedent 
 Aside from the interpretive impact of customary international 
law, however, there is also an established judicial custom in U.S. courts 
that ambiguous treaty provisions are to be construed in a manner that 
protects express and implied rights, whether or not the source of such 
rights is in international law.224 As meticulously documented by Pro-
fessor Paust, there is a long and distinguished history of case law that 
obligates judges to adopt a rights-based approach to interpreting 
treaty provisions.225 Professor Paust has shown how this interpretive 
principle emerged from a series of Supreme Court decisions and con-
tinued to be applied by the Supreme Court and other courts in the 
twentieth century.226 In Hauenstein v. Lynham (1879), for example, the 
Court declared that “[w]here a treaty admits of two constructions, 
one restrictive as to the rights, that may be claimed under it, and the 
other liberal, the latter is to be preferred.”227 And in United States v. 
Payne (1924), the Court applied itself to “[c]onstruing the treaty liber-
ally in favor of the rights claimed under it, as we are bound to do 
. . . .”228 Signiªcantly, courts have not used the word “rights” in this 
context to denote only constitutional rights, such as free speech or due 
process. U.S. courts have applied the principle articulated in cases like 
                                                                                                                      
224 See Paust, supra note 11, at 325. 
225 See id. at 325 n.118. 
226 See id. 
227 100 U.S. 483, 487 (1879) (“If the treaty admits of two interpretations, and one is 
limited, and the other liberal; one which will further, and the other exclude private rights; 
why should not the most liberal exposition be adopted?”); see also Riggs, 133 U.S. at 271–72 
(stating that “where a treaty admits of two constructions, one restrictive of rights that may 
be claimed under it and the other favorable to them, the latter is to be preferred”). 
228 264 U.S. 446, 448–49 (1924). Other examples in twentieth century cases include 
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293–94 (1933), Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 
342 (1924), St. Paul Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Venezuelan Int’l Airways, Inc. 807 F.2d 1543, 
1546 (11th Cir. 1987), Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, 
Inc. 737 F.2d 456, 458 (5th Cir. 1984), and Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 80 
(Tex. 2000) (applying Asakura to imply a right in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights to equal access to courts). 
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Hauenstein and Payne to construe treaty provisions in favor of rights as 
diverse as the right of an individual to trade as a pawnbroker,229 the 
retention of citizenship and political rights of women who marry ali-
ens,230 and inheritance rights to real property.231 Thus, both constitu-
tional and non-constitutional rights must be considered in examining 
a contentious treaty provision. At the outset, if the provision violates 
an individual right entrenched in the Constitution (or indeed, any 
article of the Constitution), the provision will have exceeded the ex-
ecutive’s treaty-making power and therefore be invalid.232 However, 
even if the provision does not clearly violate a constitutional right and 
is a valid exercise of the treaty-making power, its meaning may be am-
biguous. In this case, if there are competing interpretations, judges 
should adopt the interpretation which is more protective of a (non-
constitutional) right. 
 Of course, when a treaty provision is open to competing interpre-
tations, there are several aspects to be considered. These include the 
intentions of parties and the purpose of the treaty,233 which may be 
ascertained by examining the travaux préparatoires of the treaty,234 dip-
lomatic correspondence,235 conditions and circumstances existing at 
the time the treaty was entered into,236 the practice of signatory na-
tions since the treaty came into effect,237 how the provision is cur-
                                                                                                                      
229 See Asakura, 265 U.S. 332, 334–35 (discussing whether the business of a pawnbroker 
was a “trade,” as such term was used in the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between 
the United States and Japan, Apr. 5, 1911, U.S.-Japan, 37 Stat. 1504). 
230 See Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 244–47 (1830) (determining whether 
the petitioner was a “subject” or “citizen” as within the meaning of the Deªnitive Treaty of 
Peace Between the United States of America and his Britannic Majesty, 1793, U.S.-G.B., 8 
Stat. 81). 
231 See generally Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890) (analyzing whether Article 7 of the Consular 
Convention Between the United States of America and His Majesty, the Emperor of the 
French, Feb. 23, 1853, U.S.-Fr., art. 7, 10 Stat. 992, 996, gave French citizens the right to 
inherit land from a citizen of the United States). 
232 Arguably, a treaty provision can exceed the treaty-making power even if the Consti-
tution has not been explicitly breached, such as where the provision waives or settles 
claims of a non-commercial or non-proprietary nature, especially when the claims arose 
from a violation of human rights. But see generally Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 
(2003) (making this argument more difªcult for judges to adopt). 
233 See Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 
658, 675 (1979) (“[I]t is the intention of the parties . . . that must control any attempt to 
interpret [a] treat[y].”). 
234 Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air Fr., 386 F.2d 323, 337 (5th Cir. 1967). 
235 See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194–95 (1961). 
236 See, e.g., Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 331–32 (1912). 
237 See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp, 466 U.S. 243, 259–60 
(1984). 
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rently interpreted by the executive branch,238 and other extraneous 
factors. It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide detailed analy-
ses of these factors in treaty interpretation and their interaction with 
one another, either under international law as set forth in the VCLT 
or as they have been articulated and applied by U.S. courts. Such an 
analysis would be a considerable undertaking, especially because 
courts have not been a model of clarity in enunciating a hierarchy of 
principles in treaty interpretation.239 Although the Supreme Court 
has clearly stated that courts should look ªrst to the language of the 
treaty,240 it has not provided clear guidance on the interplay of extra-
neous factors which should be considered by judges when a textual 
analysis of a treaty provision does not yield a clear answer.241
 Nevertheless, it is at least clear that the protection of individual 
rights is at least one factor which the courts should take into account 
when construing an ambiguous treaty provision.242 In this respect, the 
Ninth Circuit’s and federal district courts’ assessment of Article 14(b) 
of the 1951 Treaty in the Japanese forced labor cases (without weight 
being accorded to the rights at stake) was clearly wanting. Moreover, as 
has been pointed out above,243 there are strong conceptual grounds 
why this rights-based approach should not be neglected. A democratic 
political system is conceptually predicated on the role of judges as pro-
tectors of individual rights, as a counter-balance to the majoritarian 
priorities of the legislature and executive.244 Furthermore, this judicial 
role is even more imperative in a federal system when state and local 
governments have actively sought to protect rights via legislation and 
other means, but have been discouraged or prevented from doing so by 
courts on the grounds of undue interference in foreign affairs.245
                                                                                                                      
238 See, e.g., El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999); Factor, 
290 U.S. at 295–98. 
239 For further commentary on this problem, see, for example, Merle H. Weiner, Navi-
gating the Road Between Uniformity and Progress: The Need for Purposive Analysis of The Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 33 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 
275, 296–98 (2002). 
240 See, e.g., United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 372–73 (1989). 
241 See id. at 373 (stating that “[o]nly when a treaty provision is ambiguous have we 
found it appropriate to give authoritative effect to extratextual materials”). But, the Court 
did not provide guidance on the hierarchy or weight of these extrinsic factors in the same 
manner as provided in the VCLT. Compare id. with supra notes 174–176. 
242 Paust, supra note 11, at 325. 
243 See supra Introduction. 
244 See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
245 See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text. 
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V. Applying Interpretive Rights-Based Approaches to Article 
14(b) of the 1951 Treaty 
 To recapitulate, there are certain established rules and principles 
which are applicable to determining the validity and scope of a treaty 
provision like Article 14(b) of the 1951 Treaty. These rules and princi-
ples were largely overlooked by the courts in the Japanese forced labor 
cases. In determining the validity of Article 14(b), courts should have 
considered, ªrstly, whether it violates a jus cogens norm, either explicitly 
or by frustrating the purpose and realization of that norm,246 and sec-
ondly, whether the treaty provision was constitutional.247 Even if a court 
determined Article 14(b) was a valid treaty provision (either because 
such a determination was technically correct as a matter of law, or be-
cause a contrary determination would be unfeasible on policy 
grounds), the court should have then proceeded to examine its 
scope.248 This stage of analysis must venture beyond merely inquiring 
into the subjects to whom the treaty applied and a facial interpretation 
of the language of the provisions, two aspects with which the judges in 
the Japanese forced labor cases were preoccupied.249 Rather, the courts 
should have identiªed the terms and phrases in Article 14(b) that were 
ambiguous or contentious, and then armed themselves with interpre-
tive approaches to construe those terms and phrases. The construction 
of ambiguous treaty provisions should not simply be a matter of indi-
vidual judges deciding which interpretation appears more convincing 
to him or her.250 In the ªrst place, there is strong authority for the view 
that, where a jus cogens norm is implicated, judges should endeavor to 
construe the provision in a manner compatible with upholding that 
norm.251 Secondly, both judicial precedent and policy considerations 
direct judges, in a situation where several competing interpretations 
present themselves, to prefer the interpretation which is most favorable 
to individual rights.252
                                                                                                                      
246 See supra Part IIA. 
247 See supra Part IIB. 
248 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra notes 46, 156 and accompanying text. 
250 As, for example, Judge Walker did in Japanese Forced Labor Litig. I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 
948, in discussing the ambit of the phrase “in the course of the prosecution of the war” in 
Article 14(b). 
251 This accords with the ªrst and second interpretive approaches outlined supra Part 
IV. 
252 This accords with the third interpretive approach outlined supra Part IV. 
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 How should the above analyses of international law, domestic 
constitutional law, and U.S. judicial precedent be applied in assessing 
the validity and scope of Article 14(b)? With respect to its validity, Ar-
ticle 14(b) appears to be void under international law for “conºicting 
with”253 a jus cogens norm, given that it purports to deny compensation 
to nationals of Allied Powers who were forced laborers.254 Many of the 
plaintiffs had not previously received any compensation at all for their 
labor, and others, namely former American POWs and civilian intern-
ees, had received only limited amounts under the WCC scheme (be-
tween $1 and $2.50 a day, which are triºing in comparison to the 
amounts received by some victims of World War II human rights 
abuses by European corporations).255 There is also no precedent to 
support the constitutional validity of a treaty provision that purports 
to prevent compensation claims for human rights abuses against cor-
porations rather than foreign governments.256 There are therefore 
strong grounds for a court to invalidate Article 14(b). 
 In reality, however, invalidating a treaty provision would be too 
radical a decision for almost all judges to make. Yet the judges in the 
Japanese forced labor cases were bound to recognize (as most of them 
did)257 the serious rights-based interests at stake.258 The most con-
structive and feasible approach for judges to have adopted, which 
would have balanced the different policy concerns at stake, would 
have been to narrowly interpret the waiver in Article 14(b) in deter-
mining its scope. While it is not possible to explore in this Article how 
each and every ambiguity in Article 14(b) could have been resolved, 
the section below demonstrates how one of the most ambiguous as-
pects of Article 14(b) would have been construed had the courts 
adopted any one of these rights-based interpretive approaches 
identiªed in Part IV. Speciªcally, the following section discusses 
whether a corporation, especially an MNC,259 can be considered a 
“national” of a state, and thereby be entitled to the protective effect of 
the waiver in Article 14(b) of the 1951 Treaty. 
                                                                                                                      
253 See VCLT, supra note 73, arts. 53, 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344, 347. 
254 See supra Part IIA. 
255 See supra notes 34, 119, 152–153. 
256 See supra Part IIB. 
257 See the ªrst two paragraphs located supra Part I. 
258 See id. 
259 For a representative deªnition of an MNC, see supra note 199. 
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A. Interpreting “Nationality” 
 In Japanese Forced Labor Litigation (2000), Judge Walker rejected 
the notion that the scope of Article 14(b) was unclear and instead 
found the language of the waiver in Article 14(b) to be “strikingly 
broad”260 and “straightforward.”261 As such, the district court did not 
even entertain the possibility that the term “nationals” in Article 
14(b) did not encompass corporations, and that, therefore, the de-
fendant corporations did not enjoy the beneªt of a waiver extended 
to “Japan and its nationals.”262 Yet there are sound reasons why the 
term “national” is ambiguous and why courts could and should have 
determined that Article 14(b) did not waive claims against corpora-
tions, but only against Japan and private Japanese citizens.263 Fur-
thermore, even if judges accepted that a waiver against “nationals” 
includes waivers against corporations in general, they ought to have 
considered the argument that the beneªt of the waiver should not 
extend to MNCs. 
 As a factual matter, the 1951 Treaty did not deªne the term “na-
tionals” to include corporations; indeed, the treaty did not provide a 
deªnition of the term at all.264 Yet, as indicated in Section A of Part 
IV, an examination of treaty practice in the post-war era reveals that 
nation-states considered the term “nationals” to be exclusive of corpo-
rate entities.265 If a treaty was intended to apply to both individuals 
and corporate entities, it would contain distinct references to “com-
panies,” as well as to “nationals.”266 Since the 1960s, commercially-
oriented treaties have more frequently expressly deªned the term 
                                                                                                                      
260 Japanese Forced Labor Litig. I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 945. 
261 Id. 
262 There was no consideration of this argument in the district court’s decision in 
Japanese Forced Labor Litigation I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Cal. 2000), in Japanese Foced 
Labor Litig. III, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2001), or in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Deutsch I, 317 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2003). In Japanese Forced Labor Litigation I, Judge Walker 
only reiterated the statement of the U.S. government that the “1951 Treaty of Peace with 
Japan . . . precludes the possibility of taking legal action in United States domestic courts 
to obtain additional compensation for war victims from Japan or its nationals—including 
Japanese commercial enterprises.” 114 F. Supp. 2d at 947(emphasis added). The argument was 
expressly noted in Mitsubishi Materials, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 164, but not examined by that 
court. 
263 See supra notes 164–170 and accompanying text. 
264 See supra note 4. 
265 See supra notes 164–170 and accompanying text. 
266 See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
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“nationals” to include corporations.267 But in the absence of such an 
express inclusion, particularly with respect to non-commercial inter-
national documents, the practice of regarding the term “nationals” as 
exclusive of corporations continues.268 It is therefore curious that 
none of the courts which heard the Japanese war reparations claims 
recognized or accepted the ambiguity of the scope of the term “na-
tionals” as it is used in Article 14(b) of the 1951 Treaty.269 It should be 
noted that the lack of clarity as to whether the term “nationals” in Ar-
ticle 14(b) encompasses corporations also stands in clear contrast to 
the facts of Garamendi, where the settlement in question was expressly 
aimed at shielding corporations from further claims.270
 Given the evident ambiguity of the term, the courts hearing the 
Japanese war reparations cases should have investigated whether there 
was a prevailing international practice to deªne “nationals” in treaties 
as encompassing corporations. From an examination of treaty prac-
tice on this matter, it is certainly a plausible conclusion that the ab-
sence of any express reference to corporations in a deªnition of the 
term “nationals” in the 1951 Treaty signiªes that the term was not in-
tended to include corporations,271 or, at the least, that it was an unre-
solved issue that the parties could not agree upon which would thus 
be left for courts to determine.272 Pursuant to the ªrst two of the 
three interpretive approaches outlined in Part IV, since a jus cogens 
norm is adversely affected by broadly construing the term “nationals” 
to encompass corporations, there is a particular reason for courts to 
narrowly construe the ambit of the term.273 Similarly, pursuant to the 
third interpretive approach identiªed above, where several competing 
interpretations of a treaty provision present themselves, judges should 
follow the strong historical precedent in U.S. courts that demands 
that they select the interpretation which is most favorable to individ-
                                                                                                                      
267 See supra note 167 and accompanying text; Brownlie, supra note 68, at 426 (“On 
the plane of international law and relations a great many treaty provisions deªne ‘nation-
als’ to include corporations . . . .”). 
268 See supra notes 169–170 and accompanying text. 
269 See supra note 262. 
270 See supra notes 136–137 and accompanying text 
271 Note that the intention of the parties at the time of entering into the treaty is 
signiªcant, not their later interpretations. 
272 The latter possibility is particularly conceivable, given that several other post-war 
settlements with Japan allowed for claims against corporations. See supra note 163 and ac-
companying text. 
273 See supra notes 184–186 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 222–223 and ac-
companying text. 
348 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 28:299 
ual rights.274 Hence, employing any one of the three interpretive can-
ons should have led courts to decide that corporations are not pro-
tected by the waiver language in Article 14(b) because they cannot be 
considered “nationals” of Japan.275
 Even if the term “nationals” were deemed to encompass corpora-
tions, it is possible that not all types of corporations could be so en-
compassed. In particular, one could argue that MNCs, by their very 
nature, cannot be deemed to be “nationals” of any one state.276 The 
issue is relevant because many of the respondents in the Japanese 
forced labor litigation were MNCs or their subsidiaries and afªliates, 
such as Nippon Steel Corporation, Mitsubishi International Corpora-
tion, and Mitsui & Co. Ltd.277 The broader issue of corporate nation-
ality has received much attention from commentators who have ex-
plored the nature and practice of MNCs, especially in light of the 
increasing globalization of economic actors.278 It is certainly now 
plausible to assert that an MNC, even though formally incorporated 
in one state, cannot be deemed to be a national of that state in the 
sense of its rights and obligations being exclusively deªned by the laws 
                                                                                                                      
274 See supra Part IVC. 
275 It can be argued that because the Japanese government exercised signiªcant con-
trol (or at least inºuence) over the corporations in Japan during World War II, Japanese 
corporations were in effect acting as part of Japan’s national war effort and as extensions 
of the Japanese government rather than as private entities. See Deutsch II, 324 F.3d at 712. 
The Ninth Circuit in Deutsch II appeared to agree with the position that the defendant 
corporations acted in the course of the “prosecution of the war,” stating that such enter-
prises “if not themselves our wartime enemies, were operating in enemy territory and pre-
sumably—no party disputes this—with the consent and for the beneªt of our wartime en-
emy.” Id. An implication of this argument is that, while the term “nationals” can generally be 
viewed as exclusive of corporations, the term must include Japanese corporations in the 
context of World War II on the grounds that those corporations did not operate as private 
entities. However, this implication ought to be rejected. See id. Most nations during World 
War II exercised signiªcant control over large-scale enterprises operating within their bor-
ders. Yet this did not prevent the drafters of post-war treaties from routinely regarding the 
term “nationals” as exclusive of corporations. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
Indeed, it did not prevent Japan herself from accepting that “nationals” did not include 
Japanese corporations in its post-war treaties, such as in the 1952 Treaty of Peace between 
the Republic of China and Japan. See supra note 165. 
276 See Vernon, supra note 199, at 114 (noting that an MNC is a “cluster of corporations 
of diverse nationality”) (emphasis added). 
277 See the defendants named in the cases cited herein, including in Japanese Forced La-
bor Litigation I, Japanese Forced Labor Litigation III, Taiheiyo I, Deutsch II, and Mitsubishi Materi-
als. 
278 See Saskia Sassen, Globalization and its Discontents 206–07 (1998); Detlev F. 
Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 
739, 740 (1970). 
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of that state.279 The traditional view of a corporation as having a legal 
personality rooted in a particular jurisdiction has been transformed 
by the practice of MNCs, whose rights and obligations are deªned by 
a conºuence of different laws, including the laws of the numerous 
jurisdictions in which they operate, the laws and rules of international 
organizations, such as the OECD,280 and to a small but increasing ex-
tent, the evolving norms of international human rights.281
 It is thus arguable that a treaty provision that purports to waive 
liability for the actions of “nationals” of a state should, if the term “na-
tionals” is deemed to include corporations and the treaty provision is 
otherwise valid, be applied with regard to substantive, rather than 
formal, nationality; and therefore should not apply to MNCs that are 
formally incorporated in that state, but whose operations are con-
ducted outside of it and whose activities are subject to an intersection 
of various national and international laws. Such a narrower construc-
tion of the ambit of a treaty provision which purports to excuse viola-
tions of human rights norms by nationals of any given state(s) is par-
ticularly appropriate in view of the exponential development and 
inºuence of international human rights laws in the past few dec-
ades.282 And in our increasingly globalized world, the time is ripe for 
adopting a progressive, substantive approach to determining the 
question of nationality. 
 In approaching waiver clauses similar to Article 14(b) in contem-
porary peace treaties, judges ought to adopt, or at least be mindful of, 
this substantive view of nationality. This would mean that, even if such 
a contemporary waiver clause differed from the 1951 Treaty by ex-
pressly deªning “nationals” to include companies or corporations, 
judges could, and probably should, deem that MNCs are not pro-
tected by that waiver clause, given that MNCs operate on an interna-
tional scale and are subject to a global intersection of laws, making it 
difªcult to regard them as nationals of any one state. Yet it should be 
                                                                                                                      
279 See Vernon, supra note 199, at 114. 
280 See Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., The OECD Guidelines for Multina-
tional Enterprises (2000). A booklet describing implementation of the guidelines can 
be found at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M000015000/M00015419.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 
2005). 
281 See, e.g., UN Global Compact, The Ten Principles, available at http://www.unglobal 
compact.org/Portal (last visited Apr. 27, 2005); see also Bus. & Human Rights Res. Ctr., 
Business and Human Rights: Principles, at http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/ 
Principles (last visited Apr. 27, 2005) (detailing other sets of evolving norms). 
282 See Higgins, supra note 88, at 95–110 (providing one account of the range of inter-
national human rights standards). 
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acknowledged that this substantive approach would likely be inappro-
priate to apply to the actions of corporations that took place over ªfty 
years ago. The actions of the respondents in the Japanese forced labor 
litigation occurred prior to the profusion of MNCs and of interna-
tional organizations impacting the activities of MNCs.283
 In any event, however, Article 14(b) of the 1951 Treaty did not ex-
pressly deªne the term “nationals” to include corporations and was 
drafted in an era when such express deªnitions were rare.284 In light of 
a historical examination of state practice which suggests that the term 
“nationals” in the 1951 Treaty was not intended to encompass any type 
of corporation, and in view of the interpretive approaches examined in 
Part IV of this Article which demand a narrow construction of the 
waiver contained in Article 14(b), Article 14(b) should be construed so 
as to permit claims against all corporations that employed forced labor. 
Conclusion 
 Assuming that a court determines that a treaty provision does not 
bar the claims of a particular claimant seeking compensation for vio-
lations of his or her rights (for example, because the treaty provision 
is invalid, or because its scope does not preclude the plaintiff’s claim, 
or because the plaintiff has never been a national of a state party to 
the treaty in question), the plaintiff must determine as a practical 
matter how to pursue his or her claim. The options include a state-law 
cause of action such as Section 354.6, common law and equitable 
causes of action such as for unjust enrichment, and the causes of ac-
tion provided in federal statutes, namely the ATCA285 and TVPA.286 As 
was amply demonstrated in the Japanese forced labor litigation, it is 
possible that none of these causes of action will eventually succeed 
(for example, if the state-law cause of action is deemed unconstitu-
tional and the remaining causes of action are time-barred).287
 However, a plaintiff’s claim pursuant to any one of these causes of 
action is at the outset dependent on a court’s examination and con-
                                                                                                                      
283 See Vagts, supra note 278, at 746 (observing that “[f]or present purposes one can 
fairly treat the [multinational enterprise] as a recent creation, certainly post-World War II 
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284 See supra notes 165–167 and accompanying text. 
285 See Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (requiring a plaintiff to be an 
“alien”). 
286 A plaintiff can only invoke the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
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struction of the relevant treaty provision. In the Japanese forced labor 
litigation, courts willingly and thoroughly explored arguments invali-
dating the claimants’ causes of action (such as the federal foreign affairs 
power as it affected Section 354.6), yet neglected to comparably exam-
ine the validity and scope of the relevant treaty provision. The courts 
failed to consider compelling grounds in international and constitu-
tional law for invalidating Article 14(b).288 Admittedly, such a consid-
eration is sometimes daunting for courts, given the judiciary’s desire 
and need to avoid confrontation with the executive and even for more 
resolute judges, the fact that policy considerations may argue in favor 
of upholding the relevant provision. However, judges are duty-bound to 
at least openly acknowledge and weigh such policy considerations— 
including those arguing against the executive’s position—and in par-
ticular, the need to safeguard rights. Where individual rights are impli-
cated, judges may not always be able to invalidate the treaty provision in 
question due to policy considerations. But in the face of any ambiguity, 
they may yet protect such rights by adopting established interpretive 
approaches to more narrowly construe the scope of the treaty provi-
sion, thereby permitting the victim’s claim and signaling a judicial un-
dertaking to shield such rights from future invasion. 
 With this approach, negotiators and drafters of future treaties 
would be forewarned that, although judges are highly unlikely to de-
clare a treaty provision invalid, courts nevertheless demand maximum 
candor and clarity in its text. 
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